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Abstract
Abstract: Empirical economic research crucially relies on highly sensitive individual datasets.
At the same time, increasing availability of public individual-level data that comes from social
networks, public government records and directories makes it possible for adversaries to poten-
tially de-identify anonymized records in sensitive research datasets. This increasing disclosure
risk has incentivised large data curators, most notably the US Census bureau and several large
companies including Apple, Facebook and Microsoft to look for algorithmic solutions to provide
formal non-disclosure guarantees for their secure data. The most commonly accepted formal
data security concept in the Computer Science community is referred to as differential privacy.
Differential privacy restricts the interaction of the researcher with the data by allowing her
to issue queries that evaluate the functions of the data. The differential privacy mechanism
then replaces the actual outcome of the query with a randomised outcome with the amount of
randomness determined by the sensitivity of the outcome to individual observations in the data.
While differential privacy does provide formal data security guarantees, its impact on the
identification of empirical economic models as well as on the performance of estimators in non-
linear empirical Econometric models has not been sufficiently studied. Since privacy protection
mechanisms are inherently finite-sample procedures, we define the notion of identifiability of the
parameter of interest as a property of the limit of experiments. It is naturally characterized by
concepts from the random sets theory and is linked to the asymptotic behavior in measure of
differentially private estimators.
We demonstrate that particular instances of regression discontinuity design and average
treatment effect may be problematic for inference with differential privacy. Under differential
privacy their estimators can only be ensured to converge weakly with their asymptotic limit
remaining random and, thus, may not be estimated consistently. This result is clearly supported
by our simulation evidence. Our analysis suggests that many other estimators that rely on
nuisance parameters may have similar properties with the requirement of differential privacy.
JEL Classification: C35, C14, C25, C13.
Keywords: Differential privacy; average treatment effect; regression discontinuity; random
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21 Introduction
A large portion of empirical work in Social Sciences and most notably in Economics relies on highly
sensitive data. Sensitivity of the data may be well understood from the personal experiential per-
spective and is largely associated with risks of potential exposure of individuals in the data when
the data may reveal their personal or financial information which consequently would make them
sensitive to the adversaries or embarrass them. At the same time, there has been a long struggle
in attempts to formalize the concept of sensitivity of the data and the related concept of “privacy
guarantee” that would measure how and to what extent sensitive attributes of the data are protected.
The most significant progress in the efforts to formalize privacy protection has been made in the
Computer Science literature. The mainstream approach there would consider any attribute of the
data as “sensitive.” At the same time, the security risks are considered in the worst-case scenario
setting where public components of the protected dataset or its summaries are accessed by an
adversary. The adversary is assumed to have an arbitrary amount of auxiliary information that he
or she can use to expose individuals in the data.
The concept of differential privacy first introduced in [14] provides, arguably, the most accepted
formal definition of the security of the data in the Computer Science literature. Differential privacy
is built on the idea of a data analyst communicating with a secure dataset by issuing queries which
are then evaluated by the privacy protection mechanism. Privacy protection mechanism alters an
actual query outcome using an independent random noise. The privacy guarantee is measured by
the maximum possible change in the distribution of the randomized query if any one data entry is
deleted or altered. In other words, differential privacy ensures that no single individual/observation
in the data can have a significant impact on the distribution of the randomized query. Differential
privacy gives a broad set of guarantees of data protection from adversarial attacks.
Given the universal theoretical appeal of differential privacy, its adoption as a security standard has
been considered by a variety of private enterprises and government bodies. For instance, Facebook
recently announced ([3]) that it will provide public access to the data on shared links within the
social network via a differentially private protocol. In 2019 the US Census bureau has announced
([1]) that it will use differential privacy as the baseline for privacy protection in 2020 Census. The
transition to the differential privacy standards has caused an outcry in Social Science community
and resulted in an open letter signed by a large number of academic researchers ([2]).
In the evaluation of privacy technologies Computer Science literature focuses on the “privacy-utility”
tradeoff. In this literature, e.g. discussed in [34], [24], [8], [50]), the main idea is that privacy
protection makes the data “noisier” which reduces its “utility” but at the same time does not
preclude one from recovering the parameter of interest from the data, albeit possibly less accurately.
In our previous work [28] we showed that this thought process is flawed. Since privacy protection
is fundamentally a finite sample paradigm, its impact on the properties of estimators has to be
studied using the concept of limits of experiments. From this perspective, the asymptotic behavior
3of the estimator of interest should be viewed as the limit of experiments where an estimator with
privacy constraints is produced from samples on an increasing size. It is important to note, however,
that in our earlier work [28] (as well as in [26], [27]) we do not analyze differential privacy. There
we consider a framework where the data needed for estimation has to be combined from different
split datasets and analyze the identification of the parameter of interest in the presence of privacy
guarantees. In particular, we show that the concept of k-anonymity, which was one of the first
attempts at a formal definition of privacy and is discussed below in more detail, is incompatible
with the parameter identification in conditional moment models, which, of course, include many
commonly used econometric models. With any degree of k-anonymity imposed on the data one
can only recover a pseudo-identified set for the parameter of interest. This set is generally a non-
singleton subset of the parameter space and it does not include the true parameter. In other words,
the “privacy-utility” tradeoff is meaningless if one wants to enforce k-anonymity guarantees.
In this paper we demonstrate that a similar drawback is inherent in the concept of differential privacy.
There are without a doubt situations when differentially private estimation will be compatible with
parameter identification. These are usually situation when the maximum of the influence function
of the estimator – the differential privacy literature refers to it as global sensitivity – converges to
zero.1 In this paper we show that differentially private versions of several important estimators,
including regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimators and standard average treatment effect
(ATE) estimators, are incompatible with parameter identification. We show that the main reason for
this is the fact that the weights of observations used in these estimation techniques are data-driven.
That is, the fact that the weights of some observations may drastically change with the change in
one data point leads to these estimators having global sensitivities bounded away from zero (and in
some cases even being infinite) even asymptotically. This leads to the loss of identification. Since
the issue of data-driven weights is typical in many important econometric approaches, we believe
that our negative findings will extend to other important frameworks.
Before we review the formal notion of a differentially private mechanism and present our findings, we
want to touch upon some important issues in the privacy-related research. It is clear that in order
to talk about privacy-preserving approaches and their properties, one has to be able to characterize
formally the level of exposure induced by the adversary. This can done, for instance, in accordance
with the US Census Bureau’s analysis in [30] which distinguishes between identity disclosure, where
an adversary is able to identify if a specific data entry belongs to a certain individual, and attribute
disclosure where an adversary is able to find out if a particular individual has a particular character-
istic (e.g. belongs to a certain group). Formal legal approaches to protection of individual data, for
instance, behind HIPAA and FERPA are based on clear prioritization of identity disclosure over at-
tribute disclosure and mandate the removal of specific demographic and personal identifiers to make
1When differentially private estimation is compatible with parameter identification, then the issue of the asymptotic
distribution of the differentially private estimator arises. It is a different problem and we don’t discuss it in detail in
this paper. However, we briefly touch upon this issue in Example 1 in Section 2, where one can see that to ensure
traditional rates one would need the global sensitivity to converge to zero fast enough.
4the data “less sensitive.” Computer Science literature, at the same time, clearly demonstrates that
the reduction in “sensitivity” of the data based on potential exposure level by removing individual
characteristics is highly ineffective.2 The examples of successful attacks on the “anonymized” data
lead to the early work on the formal definition of privacy guarantees that resulted, in particular, in
the development and the implementation (see [45], [46], [47], [32], [5], [33], [12], among others) of
the so-called k-anonymity approach. A database instance is said to provide k-anonymity, for some
number k, if every way of singling an individual out of the database returns records for at least k
individuals. In other words, anyone whose information is stored in the database can be “confused”
with k others. It is important to note that the k-anonymity approach was primarily targeted to pre-
vent the identity disclosure and, as is well known, does not prevent the attribute disclosure. It also
implicitly requires that the data curator responsible for protecting the data is aware of all possible
auxiliary information that could be available to the adversary. These features make k-anonymity
and its variants rather impractical.
The concept of differential privacy developed in [13] provides a measure of privacy guarantees with-
out these complications and addresses both identity and attribute disclosure concerns. Differential
privacy formalizes the interaction of a user with a “sensitive” database via queries that are sub-
mitted through a secure server with a privacy protection mechanism. These queries are functions
that need to be computed on the data representing summaries or tabulations of the data. The
assumed risk to the database is that the queries to the database can be issued by an adversary. The
privacy protection mechanism has two main elements that allow it to be effective against arbitrary
adversaries. First, it takes into account the “sensitivity” of the query to the data, that measures the
maximum change in the output of the function computed on the data if any data entry is deleted
or altered. Second, it independently randomizes the outcome of the query which ensures that the
produced outcome is not correlated with any auxiliary information that an adversary may have.
More formally, when the query to the data is an estimator θ̂, for instance, representing a mean
or a median of a particular variable in the data or the vector of estimated coefficients in a linear
model, differential privacy requires to replace the point estimator of interest θ̂ with a randomized
function θ(PN , ν), where PN is the empirical distribution of the dataset and ν is an independent
random element. In other words, it is required that the estimator is randomized using independent
noise. Independence of random element ν from the data sample is essential, since any correlation
may allow adversary to recover potentially sensitive attributes of observations in the data. While
2For instance, [47] identified the medical records of William Weld, then governor of Massachusetts, by linking
voter registration records to “anonymized” Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC) medical encounter
data, which retained the birthdate, sex, and zip code of the patient. In another example in [41] the risk of disclosure
was identified in the so-called “Netflix prize dataset.” In 2009 Netflix announced a competition with a grand prize of
$1M for developers of the prediction algorithm that would use the information on past viewership history for given
consumer and how this consumer rated those movies and be be able to predict how that consumer would rate the
movies that he or she has not seen yet. For this competition Netflix released an “anonymized” dataset containing
100,480,507 ratings produced by 480,189 consumers. [41] used the public movie review data of users from imdb.com
and were able to link a significant fraction of “anonymous” consumers on Netflix to imdb.com users based on the
uniqueness of watch histories.
5the distribution of the random element can be adjusted to the general properties of the population
data distribution PN such as the sample size N and the number of variables, it may not depend on
the specific values of observations identifying the location of point masses of PN .
We now provide formal definition of differential privacy in application to randomized estimator
θ(PN , ν).
DEFINITION 1 ((, δ)-differential privacy [13]). A randomized estimator θ(PN , ν) is (, δ)-differentially
private if for any two empirical distributions PN and P′N over N support points and differing (ar-
bitrarily) in only one support point, we have that for all measurable sets A of possible outputs the
following holds:
Pν [θ(PN , ν) ∈ A] ≤ ePν [θ(P′N , ν) ∈ A] + δ, (1.1)
where  > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1) are privacy parameters and probabilities are taken over randomness in ν. In
addition, if δ = 0, then the estimator θ(PN , ν) is referred to as -differentially private.
In this definition we use notation Pν(·) to emphasize that differentially private estimator θ(PN , ν) is
based on the distribution of random element ν while the distributions of two adjacent datasets PN
and P′N are fixed. The bound in the definition has to be valid for any possible empirical distributions
of the data PN and P′N different in one support point no matter what the probability of realization
of these datasets is.
In Section 2 we discuss this notion in detail and review some common differential privacy practice.
We then develop a notion of identification under differential privacy. As we can see from Definition
1, the differential privacy approach is implemented in the finite samples whereas, as is well known,
identification in Economics and Econometrics is a population property. Thus, to bring these two
worlds – the population and finite sample – together, we propose to look at the identification (or
lack of such) as the property of the limit of experiments, an idea we used in our previous work
[28] for privacy under data combination. However, the identification approach we suggest under
differential privacy is different from that in [28], which is not surprising given that differentially
privacy is a fundamentally distinct approach for privacy protection. We first consider a set of
estimators that can obtained in a finite sample by applying a differentially private mechanism. This
can be viewed as a random set and, thus, it is only natural for us to rely on the well-developed and
extremely useful theory of random sets of [39] and [40] when defining the notion of identification in
the limit of experiments. We argue that the selection expectation the random set of estimators or
other deterministic characteristics of the random sets are not suitable notions for identification basis
in this case as they are in conflict with the practice and fundamental requirements of differential
privacy. Instead, we argue that it is suitable to base the notion of identification on the weak limit
of these random sets in the limit of sequence of experiments and its corresponding containment
functional. We discuss the notion of identification and pseudo-identified set and illustrate them with
some examples.
In Section 3 we conduct the identification analysis for differentially private estimators in regression
6discontinuity design models. We establish the lack of identification for differentially private versions
of nonparametric regression at the boundary and local linear estimators. We also discuss implications
of differential privacy for specification tests in the RDD framework and present some simulation
evidence.
In Section 4 we conduct the identification analysis and the performance of differentially private
estimators in models with treatment effects and show that generally the ATE under differential
privacy is not identified.
Section 5 concludes.
The proofs of all the results are collected in the Appendix.
2 Identification with Formal Privacy Guarantees
2.1 Preliminaries
In our previous work [28] we considered identification in models where a researcher has access to a
dataset that was obtained by combining split datasets subject to constraints on the prevention of
the identity disclosure. There, both the data combination procedure and the impositions of privacy
constraints such as k-anonymity) were intrinsically finite sample procedures. To reconcile the nature
of these procedures with the population nature of the identification, we argued that the identification
notion for econometric models from combined and privacy-protected data can only be defined as a
limit of a combined output of the privacy preserving procedure and finite sample distribution of the
data. In this paper, we aim to develop an approach to analyze identification of econometric models
when the data curator requires the output of the econometric procedure to be differentially private.
For that, we can use ideas realted to those in [28].
As discussed in the introduction, in the context of point estimation differential privacy requires one
to replace the point estimator of interest θ̂ with a randomized functional θ(PN , ν), where PN is
the empirical distribution of a given dataset and ν ∈ V is an independent random element which
is assumed to be belong to a Banach space V. In other words, it is required that the estimator
is randomized using independent noise orthogonal to the distribution inducing PN . Independence
of random element ν from the data sample is essential as any correlation between them may allow
adversary to recover potentially sensitive attributes of observations in the data. Randomized esti-
mator θ(PN , ν) in Definition 1 only ensures that information regarding individual data entry cannot
be reverse-engineered from its values. There are two important features of the privacy preserving
methodology we want to emphasize. The first one is that even though the distribution of ν can be
adjusted to the general properties of the population data distribution in PN (such as the the number
of variable and the support variables) and can depend on the sample size N , it may not depend on
the specific values of observations producing PN . The second feature is that the privacy protection
has to be guaranteed for every possible realization of the data PN . These two features contribute to
7the powerful privacy-preserving framework delivered by differential privacy. But at the same time
they contribute to the possible lack of identification of parameters in differentially private versions
of some important econometric models (examples of those are given in section 3 and 4), which as
we will see, will be closely related to poor asymptotic properties of differentially private estimators
in these models.
It is clear from the definition of differential privacy that the smaller values of parameters ε ≥ 0 and
δ ≥ 0 (especially ε as it measures the range of the likelihood ratio of distributions of randomized
estimators with two adjacent datasets while δ measures the (lack of) overlap between the sets of these
randomized estimators) correspond to stricter privacy restrictions and have to be chosen by a data
curator. As noted in [14], it is advisable that parameters in the definition of (ε, δ)-differential privacy
are calibrated such that both of them are allowed to approach zero as the sample size increases. in
this case we can write them as (εN , δN ). Our coverage and the identification notion will allow for a
variety of situations – we can(εN , δN ) to be constant as well decreasing with N and this is formally
given in Section 2.2.
To give readers a more complete coverage of differential privacy approaches, we start with an example
of a statistical procedure that admits consistent parameter estimation even with the requirement of
differential privacy (such examples can be found in [15], among others).
EXAMPLE 1 (Sample mean of a random variable with a bounded support). Suppose that our goal
is the estimation of the mean of random variable X with a bounded support from the sample of i.i.d.
observations {Xi}Ni=1 with empirical distribution PN . Consider the so-called Laplace mechanism
when the estimator θ(PN , νN ) is obtain in the following additively separable fashion
θ(PN , νN ) = X¯ + aN (νN ),
aN (νN ) ∼ Lap(0, λN )
where the Laplace distribution Lap(µ, λ) has density p(x;µ;λ; ) = 12λ exp
(
− |x−µ|λ
)
. If we choose
µ = 0 and λN =
diam(Θ)
NεN
(or greater of equal ), where Θ denotes the support of X, then θ(PN , νN )
is (εN , 0)-differentially private because for any z ∈ R,
faN (νN )
(
z − X¯) ≤ eεN faN (νN )(z − X¯ − 1N (X ′i −Xi)
)
,
for any Xi, X
′
i and X¯.
If εN remains bounded away from zero or even if εN → 0 as N →∞ but NεN →∞, then θ(PN , νN )
is obviously a consistent estimator of the population mean of X as the variance of the noise factor νN
decreases to zero. If, however, εN = O(
1
N ), then θ(PN , νN ) can be shown to be no longer consistent.
If instead of looking at just θ(PN , νN ), one wants to analyze the asymptotic behavior of the
√
N(θ(PN , νN )− E[X]) (2.1)
8traditionally used for econometric inference, then one can show that if Nε2N → ∞, then the weak
limit of (2.1) is the same as for
√
N(X¯ − E[X]) – that is, N (0, V ar[X]). If Nε2N → constant > 0,
then the weak limit of (2.1) is still normal but with a large variance, thus leading to less accuracy in
the estimation. If Nε2N → 0, then the weak limit of (2.1) does not exist.
Thus, as we can see in Example 1, it is possible to have differentially private versions of sample
means with inference being pretty much the same as for the original estimator. It does not mean,
however, that differential privacy is broadly compatible with econometric inference. Example 2
below demonstrates that even in the case of the sample mean a differentially private estimator may
lose its nice asymptotic properties if we take X whose support is unbounded.
EXAMPLE 2 (Sample mean of a random variable with unbounded support). Suppose that in
contrast with the situation in Example 1 the support of X is unbounded (for simplicity, we will
take it to be R) but the variance of X is still finite. Then an (ε, δ)- differentially private estimator
θ(PN , νN ) obtained by the addition of a mean zero noise to the sample mean X¯ = 1N
∑N
i=1Xi may
not be consistent.
Indeed, suppose that the noise component has the density faN (νN )(·). Definition 1 requires that at
each point and, in particular, at X¯
faN (νN )
(
X¯
) ≤ eεfaN (νN )(X¯ + 1N (X ′i −Xi)
)
+ δ,
for any Xi, X
′
i and X¯.
The existence of the finite mean of random variable aN (νN ) is equivalent to the convergence of the
improper integral
∫∞
v
t faN (νN )(t) dt for each v, which requires that limt→∞ t faN (νN )(t) = 0 This implies
that we can choose X ′i and Xi such that faN (νN )
(
X¯ + 1N (X
′
i −Xi)
) ≤ 12e−εfaN (νN ) (X¯) .
Given that X¯ can be an arbitrary value on the real line3, Definition 1 then requires that for all N
and all points t ∈ R, it holds that faN (νN )(t) < 2δ, which is clearly incompatible with the consistency
of the estimator which would require “concentration” of the distribution of aN (νN ) around zero as
N →∞.
Note that we have inconsistency of our differentially private estimator here even for fixed (ε, δ). If
the parameters of differential privacy are drifting to zero with N the inconsistency problem would
become even more severe.
One approach to “fix” the behavior of the estimator is to consider trimmed or windsorised versions
of the sample mean. Trimming would bound the scale of noise that will need to be added to the
estimator. That, however, may interfere with the asymptotic distribution of the mean depending
3Of course, some values of X¯ may be considered to be very unlikely but we want to note here that the differential
privacy notion requires considering all possible realizations of the samples regardless of their likelihood, and for any
value on the real line we can certainly find realizations of PN that will give the sample mean equal to that value
9on the tail behavior of the distribution of X leading to the domination of the distribution of the
differentially private estimator by the added noise.
We would like to emphasize that Example 2 demonstrates the non-existence of consistent differen-
tially private estimators for means of unbounded random variables generated by additive noise. One
may ask if maybe some non-additive way to incorporate noise would result in a consistent differen-
tially private estimator. Our later discussion in Section 2.4 shows that in this situation inconsistency
is an intrinsic property of any differentially private estimator with some basic smoothness require-
ments. As is evident from Example 1, support restrictions may mitigate this issue, but the fact that
Definition 1 is incompatible with consistent estimation of means of many commonly used random
variables appears to be an unfortunate shortcoming of differential privacy. Our detailed analysis of
popular applied econometrics methods in sections 3 and 4 will cover and discuss similar shortcomings
even in models with bounded supports for all the variables.
One reason we have focused on the consistency property so far is because it is a minimum desirable
property of a good estimator. The second reason is directly related to what we do in the remainder of
this section – our notion of identification is related to weak limits of differentially private estimators
and the property of consistency describe special cases of those weak limits.
2.2 Formal framework
In this section, we present our formal approach to identification for models with differentially private
outcomes.
We consider a sequence of statistical experiments indexed by the sample size N (N → ∞ along
this sequence), where for each N we generate an i.i.d. sample {zi}Ni=1 from the joint distribution of
d-dimensional random vector Z leading to empirical distribution PN . We assume that the parameter
of interest θ0 is in the interior of p-dimensional convex compact parameter space Θ ⊂ Rp
We then consider randomized estimators θ(PN , νN ) ∈ Θ where random element νN ensures that these
randomized estimators are (εN , δN )-differentially private for some sequences εN and δN . To ensure
protection from adversarial attacks on data PN added random element νN has to be statistically
independent from νN .
In our analysis in this section we use the techniques from the theory of random sets which reflect the
spirit of data analysis with differential privacy: the random element νN or the technique that is used
to produce the randomized estimator θ(PN , νN ) aiming to represent parameter of interest θ0 may not
be available to the researcher. Instead, data curator controlling the dataset inducing the empricial
distribution PN reports parameters (εN , δN ) which yield the upper bound guarantee for differential
privacy of a given estimated output (and, possibly, the algorithm used for implementation of θ(·, ·)).
This means that there can be an entire class of estimators for parameter θ0 that satisfy differential
privacy with these parameters.
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While we provided examples of mechanisms that can be used to achieve differential privacy in
the previous section, we need to formally define the structure of a general differentially private
estimator. A differentially private estimator takes as an input data sample that produced empirical
distribution PN and a random element νN and outputs a point in Θ. We treat νN as a “seed” for
randomness represented by a fixed standardized random variable that is then transformed by the
estimator into the random variable used in a particular mechanism for differential privacy. E.g. νN
can be a uniformly distributed random variable (or a vector of such variables) on [0, 1] that is then
transformed by a mechanism into a Laplace random variable. We now give a formal description of
the class of our considered estimators.
ASSUMPTION 1. The class of estimators is formed by a class of bounded operatorsM such that:
(i) M is a collection parametric families of operators such that operators Mθ,ν ∈ M are well-
defined for each θ ∈ Θ and ν ∈ V;
(ii) Mθ,ν : D(Rd; [0, 1]) 7→ Rp for all Mθ,ν ∈ M and all θ ∈ Θ and ν ∈ V (where D(Rd; [0, 1]) is
the Skorohod space of functions);
(iii) For each F ∈ D(Rd; [0, 1]) and parametric family {Mθ,ν : θ ∈ Θ, ν ∈ V}, Mθ,ν(F ) is Lipchitz-
continuous in θ and ν;
(iv) Differentially private estimator is θ(PN , νN ) is defined as a solution of the system of equations
Mθ,νN (PN ) = 0
for θ over parametric family {Mθ,ν : θ ∈ Θ, ν ∈ V} where PN is the empirical distribution of
sample {zi}Ni=1.
We can illustrate this assumption for differentially private estimate of a sample mean using Laplace
mechanism for the sample i.i.d. draws {Xi}Ni=1 of random varible with bounded support and random
element νN ∼ U [0, 1]. In this case Mθ,ν(F ) =
∫ +∞
−∞ z dF (z) +
diam(Θ)
NεN
F−1Λ (ν)− θ (where F−1Λ (·) is
the inverse cdf of the standard Laplace distribution). We note that the empirical moment induced
by this operator produces (εN , 0)-differentially private estimator as discussed in Example 1.
Once we imposed the structure on the class of estimators that we consider (that inherit the structure
of the underlying functional space), we want to focus our attention on the classes of differentially pri-
vate estimators that have certain desirable properties. These properties are formulated in Definition
2 below.
Here and thereafter we will consider differential privacy parameters (εN , δN ) such that εN ≤ ε¯ and
δN ≤ δ¯ for all N for some universal constants ε¯ and δ¯.
DEFINITION 2. For a given sequence of (εN , δN ), we say that an (εN , δN )-differentially private
estimator θ(·, ·) : ZN ×V → Θ satisfying Assumption 1 is regular for the parameter of interest θ0 if
the following conditions hold:
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(i) θ(PN , νN ) is a continuous random variable with respect to the Lebesgue measure;
(ii) in the absence of the mechanism noise – that is, when the estimator is θ(PN , 0), – there exists
a function R¯(Nκ), such that lim
N→∞
R¯(N,κ) = 0 that for all N and for all κ > 0:
P (‖θ(PN , 0)− θ0‖ > κ) ≤ R¯(N,κ); (2.2)
(iii) θ(PN , νN ) has a weak limit if the sequence (εN , δN ) is convergent.
Condition (i) states that the distribution of θ(·, ·) has a density. Condition (ii) implies that in the
absence of any mechanism noise are informative for the parameter of interest θ0 – in particular, the
estimator is consistent and has a guaranteed rate of convergence (in most practical scenarios R¯(N,κ)
would be required to be exponentially decreasing in N and κ). The condition that function θ(·, ·)
takes values in Θ only, ensures that in cases when the mechanism noise would drive the estimator
outside of the parameter space Θ, such an estimator would be projected on the boundary of Θ.
Finally, condition (iii) requires the differentially private estimator to converge in distribution.
Now, having defined a class of regular differentially private estimators, we make the next step towards
the notion of identification.
Our next notion will depend on the set of sequences of (εN , δN ) a data curator is willing to consider.
E.g. it could be the set of sequences where εN and δN do not change with N , or it could a set of
sequences converging to zero at a certain rate. We will refer to a fixed set of sequences as E . We
will suppose that this set of sequences is a join-semilattice in the coordinate-wise partial order for
(εN , δN ) – that is, the join of any two sequences from E is also in E .
Following [39], we use the concept of measurable selection to define the set of all regular differentially
private estimators.
DEFINITION 3. Consider set T∗N,E of all random variables θ(PN , νN ) : ZN × V 7→ Θ satisfying
Definition 2 and corresponding to sequences (εN , δN ) from E. We define random set TN,E referred
to as the set of regular differentially private estimators for θ0 for a given E as the completion of the
set T∗N,E ∩ L1(P) with respect to L1(P)-norm.
L1(P) is a space of measurable functions that map the elements of the σ-algebra on ZN (with
the product measure defined by the probability measure on Z) and the σ-algebra associated with
random elements νN mapping into Rp, and for which the Euclidean norm is integrable. By definition
of θ(·, ·) in 2 and compactness of Θ, all elements in T∗N,E and, thus, in TN,E as well are bounded in
the L1-norm.
Random set TN,E is compact and convex in the sense of Definitions 1.30 and 4.32 in [39], as shown
in Lemma 1.
LEMMA 1. TN is convex and compact random set.
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Our next step in the formulation of the identification notion is to suggest which notion of limit to
apply to random sets. At the first glance, the use of the probability limit might seem like a natural
approach if we want to somehow relate the identifiability of the parameter to the fact that random
sets TN,E overlap with an arbitrary neighborhood of θ0 with probability approaching 1. However,
the notion of the probability limit is too strong as it will not allow us to talk about the limit in the
following simple instance of regular differentially private estimators:
θ(PN , νN ) = θ(PN , 0) + aN (νN )
where the variance of aN (νN ) remains constant or increases as N → ∞ (the estimator θ(PN , 0) in
the absence of the mechanism noise is, of course, consistent by the condition (ii) in Definition 2).
As we will see later, such situations will be prevalent in the estimation of ATE and RDD models.
In fact, we already conveyed our intention to consider weak limits in condition (iii) in Definition 2.
The next lemma demonstrates that weak convergence is the strongest plausible convergence concept
to consider unless weal limits of regular differentially private estimators are constant.
LEMMA 2. Suppose that θ(PN , νN )
W→ τ as n → 0. Then if τ is not constant with a positive
probability, then there exists κ¯ > 0 and γ > 0 such that for all κ ≤ κ¯
lim sup
N→∞
P (|θ(PN , νN )− τ | > κ) > γ.
Theorem 1 establishes weak convergence of the convex compact random set TN,E when all the
sequences of (εN , δN ) in E are convergent.
THEOREM 1. For a E be the join-semilattice that consists of only convergent sequences of
(εN , δN ). The random set TN,E as defined in Definition 3 weakly converges to a random set TE ,
which is the closure of all weak limits of estimators in the respective random set T∗N,E .
The convergence result of Theorem 1 is essentially a result of what happens in the limit of statistical
experiments. Naturally, we will base our notion of identifiability and, more generally, pseudo-
identified sets, on some characteristics of the random set TE .
2.2.1 Characterization of the limiting random set TE . Notions of identification and
(pseudo)-identified set.
Our next step will be to produce a tangible characterization of the random set TE and define the
information content delivered by this set TE with regard to the parameter of interest. The best case
scenario from the information content point of view is the case when TE is the degenerate distribution
concentrated at θ0, which essentially means that the sequence of the statistical experiments delivers
the true parameter values in the limit. Generally, however, this may not be the case. One of the
main difficulties in characterizing this set and its information content is that it may not contain
the target parameter θ0 (i.e. it can be “biased”) and that the distribution of TE may not be
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degenerate (i.e. it is not “consistently” estimating θ0). Some important work in the random sets
literature, such as [7] and [6], defined the information content (or, in other words, identified set) as
the selection expectation of a random set. In our previous work [28] we used the concept related to
selection expectation to analyze the impact of privacy guarantees (in particular, k-anonymity) under
data combination.4 Thus, selection expectation might seem like a promising approach to explore
in our framework as well, especially given that such characterization is deterministic, but for the
reasons explained below (privacy budget for differentially private mechanisms and the impossibility
of repeated experiments), in the differentially private setting we do not see this approach as a fruitful
one. Instead, our pseudo-identified set (“pseudo-” because it does not necessarily contain the true
parameter value) will be the random set TE itself. The notion of a random identified or a random
pseudo-identified set is not traditional in econometrics as usually researchers are able to extract
deterministic consensus about which parameter values can be driving observables. We argue that
in the differentially private setting this is the preferable approach. Some other work, such as [25]
employed the notion of random identified set. In [25], the source of probability that induces the
random identified set is the posterior uncertainty for the identifiable parameters. In our case, this
source is a combination of the sampling uncertainty of the observations and the mechanism noise,
and it is not possible to separate these two sources.
Having given the gist of the content of this section, we now turn to a more detailed discussion.
First, as mentioned above, in the context of converging random sets, as for converging random
variables, the notion of the expectation or the median (or some other quantile) might appear a
natural way to characterize the limit (and consequently provide the framework for identification).
Recall that the selection (or Aumann) expectation of random set TN,E denoted ETN,E is the closure
of the set {E ξ : ξ ∈ TN,E}. However, the selection expectation (along with any first-order statistic,
such as the Vorob’ev’s expectation) fails to be “representative” for the limiting random set TE . This
lack of representativeness stems from the inherent impossibility to replicate a statistical experiment
whose outcome is the regular differentially private estimator driven by the required structure of
differentially private systems as discussed in [15]. Indeed, in the context of differentially private
systems no function evaluated on the data can be considered in isolation. Differential privacy is
the property of the entirety of all functions that have ever been or will ever be evaluated from a
given dataset. By the composition property of differential privacy, two different functions that, for
instance, are (ε/2, 0)-differentially private each constitute one combined (at most) (ε, 0)-differentially
private data query. As a result, if ε in the definition of differential privacy is considered to be a
policy parameter, then it determines the “privacy budget” of a given database. The more functions
need to be evaluated from the data, the more noise will need to be added to each function to ensure
the entire set of functions is within the “privacy budget.” The evaluation of K functions to ensure
(ε, 0)-differential privacy requires the output of each function to be (ε/K, 0)-differentially private,
i.e. each output should be K times less sensitive to arbitrary changes in individual observations in
the dataset.
4As discussed in the introduction, k-anonymity is a formal privacy guarantee that predates differential privacy).
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One natural way to extend the “privacy budget” of a given dataset is to ensure that the output
corresponding to the evaluation of the exactly same function of the data always remains the same. In
this case, the random element νN to produce the regular differentially private estimator θ(PN , νN )
is generated only once and then any data user who wants to estimate a given parameter θ0 will
observe exactly the same value of the randomized estimator θ(PN , νN ). In other words, repeated
identical queries to the data always result in the same (randomized only once) output.
From this perspective, the concept of the selection expectation or other related statistics is clearly
misleading for a characterization of the limiting random set TE . While it may be the case that
EνN θ(PN , νN ) is close to θ0 with high probability (asN →∞) for all measurable selections θ(PN , νN )
of TN,E , there is no guarantee that θ(PN , νN ) is also close to θ0 with high probability and under
“privacy budget” considerations there is no way a researcher can access repeated samples from the
distribution θ(PN , νN ) corresponding to a given empirical distribution PN to “average out” the
added noise νN . To put in other words, given the “privacy budget” considerations, the selection
expectation EνN θ(PN , νN ) is not “feasible” in the differentially private framework. Moreover, as
we illustrate in the example in Section 2.3, differential privacy may be in conflict even with the
identification of expectations. It is clear that we need to use a different approach to characterizing
the limiting random set TE .
To provide a comprehensive characterization of random sets TN,E and TE we use the notion of the
containment functional adopted from [39]:
DEFINITION 4. Functional CX(K) = P (X ⊂ K) for convex compact subset of Θ is referred to
as the containment functional of random set X.
By Theorem 1.7.8 in [39] containment functional provides a complete characterization of convex
compact random set. Moreover, it is sufficient to choose the “test sets” K to be convex polytopes.
Coverage functional preserves the property of the weak convergence of the sequence of random sets.
We summarize this in the following theorem
THEOREM 2. Under conditions of Theorem 1 for any convex polytope K ⊂ Θ
CTN,E (K)→ CTE (K), as N →∞.
This theorem is a simple corollary of Theorem 1.6.5 in [39] and it ensures that the coverage functional
preserves the properties of the converging sequence of random sets TN,E and, more importantly, its
limit TN,E . The characterization of the limiting coverage functional would equivalently characterize
the limiting random set. In other words, the analysis of weak convergence of random sets can be
replaced with the analysis of pointwise convergence of the coverage function on the set of convex
polytopes contained in Θ.
We now formulate the notion of identifiability of the parameter of interest.
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DEFINITION 5 (Identifiability of parameter under differential privacy). Let E include only some
converging sequences of (εN , δN ). We will say that the parameter θ0 is identified in the regular
(εN , δN )-differentially private framework, where the sequences of (εN , δN ) belong to E, if and only if
for any α ∈ (0, 1) and any convex polytope K 3 θ0
CTE (K) ≥ 1− α.
Theorem 3 below gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of parameter θ0.
THEOREM 3. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 1 hold. For any sequence of (εN , δN ) from E
it holds that any regular (εN , δN )-differentially private estimator θ(PN , νN ) is such that
θ(PN , νN )
p→ θ0,
if and only if for any α ∈ (0, 1) and any convex polytope K 3 θ0 we have CTE (K) ≥ 1−α and, thus,
the parameter θ0 is identifiable even under differential privacy.
Theorem 3 provides our characterization of identifiability which corresponds to the convergence of
the sequence of random sets to a singleton. In other words, this parallels consistency for sequences
of ordinary random variables.
Based on the same principles we can characterize the case of non-identifiability .
DEFINITION 6 (non-identifiability of parameter under differential privacy). Let E consist of
converging sequences of (εN , δN ). We will say that the parameter θ0 is non-identified in the regular
(εN , δN )-differentially private framework, where the sequences of (εN , δN ) belong to E, if and only if
there exists β ∈ (0, 1) and a convex polytope Kβ 3 θ0 such that
CTE (Kβ) ≤ 1− β.
Non-identifiability implies that the limiting random set is not degenerate. Therefore, it becomes
impossible to pinpoint the true parameter θ0 by tracing a “mass point” of the coverage function of
that limiting random set TE . This makes the analysis of partial identification in our case different
from the traditional approach where partial identification aims to construct a deterministic set that
contains the parameter of interest θ0. In our case where the coverage function is non-degenerate in
the limit it is impossible to construct such a deterministic set. At the same time, coverage function
itself may be difficult to work with in practice. To address this we define the (pseudo)-identified set
as a set of probability distributions:
DEFINITION 7. Pseudo-identified set for parameter of interest θ0 produced by regular differen-
tially private estimators is a class of distribution functions Fθ0,E such that for each F ∈ Fθ0,E there
exists measurable selection ξ ∈ TE such that F is the distribution function of ξ.
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2.3 llustration of Theorem 1 and notions of identifiability, non-identifiability and
pseudo-identified set for a simple example
One of the mechanisms most commonly used to induce differential privacy in theoretical literature
(e.g. [15]) is the Laplace mechanism in which the original estimator is augmented by the addition of
independent double exponential (or, Laplace) noise calibrated in a specific way. In this section, we
consider an example in which we illustrate the construction of a more general family of differentially
private estimators by combining the Laplace mechanism with a random subsampling procedure.
The resulting combination produces a random set of regular differentially private estimators. For
simplicity and for the sake of highlighting important issues related to identifiability, we will even
assume that the researcher is informed of the Bernoulli-Laplace mechanism being used to deliver a
differentially private output, even though in practice a data curator may not release that information
(hence, our generic notation for a “seed” νN ).
The reason why we want to highlight this specific mechanism is because, as we discuss further in this
paper, many relevant estimators in Economics can be viewed as being. constructed from weighted
means. In fact, in the RDD models estimation in Section 3 and in the ATE estimation in Section 4 it
will be clear that the lack of identifiability under differential privacy and poor statistical performance
of regular differentially private estimators (even with relatively weak privacy requirements) will
stem, in particular, from the weights of observations not being fixed but decided by the data. These
weights may vary in a certain fixed interval even when only one observation in the dataset becomes
different. The example in this section considers an extreme version of such situations when the
weights of observations in the weighted mean are 0/1 with some probabilities and these weights are
independent of other available data. It provides a nice support for our subsequent discussion of
RDD and ATE differentially private estimators.
We will take X to have support on [0, 1], and we will be interested in the parameter θ0 = E[X].
We consider the following mechanism for obtaining a regular differentially private estimator (the
choice of (εN , δN ) parameters is discussed later) on the basis of the i.i.d. sample {xi}Ni=1.
1. First, we create a subsample from {xi}Ni=1 that would independently randomly include each
observation with probability piN and that would exclude it with probability 1− piN
2. We compute the weighted average of the included observations and output that weighted
average with added random variable uN , where uN ∼ Lap(0, λN ):
θ(PN , νN ) =
1
npiN
n∑
i=1
dixi + uN ,
where di is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter piN . Variables di, i = 1, . . . , N , are
mutually independent. To ensure that θ(PN , νN ) ∈ Θ, we consider the estimator as projection
of θ(PN , νN ) on Θ.
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The addition of the Laplace noise to an estimator was one of the first mechanisms proposed to
guarantee differential privacy in [14].
To analyze differential privacy guarantee achieved by this mechanism, note that Definition 1 is
satisfied for some εN and for δN = 0 if for each pair of samples different from each other by a single
observation (suppose this is N -th observation), the likelihood ratio
LN ≡ c+ a
c+ b
= 1 +
a− b
c+ b
,
where
a = piN
∑
Sυ⊆S\{xN}
pi
|Sυ|
N (1− piN )n−1−|Sυ| · e−
|t−θ˜Sυ∪{xN}|
λN ,
b = piN
∑
Sυ⊆S\{xN}
pi
|Sυ|
N (1− piN )n−1−|Sυ| · e−
|t−θ˜Sυ∪{x′N}
|
λN ,
c = (1− piN )
∑
cST⊆S\{xN}
pi
|Sυ|
N (1− piN )n−1−|Sυ| · e−
|t−θ˜Sυ |
λN
does not exceed eε. Note that the maximum absolute change in our estimator with the change
in one observation (the so-called global sensitivity) is 1/(N piN ). Using the partition of unity∑
Sυ⊆S\{xN}
pi
|Sυ|
N (1− piN )N−1−|Sυ| = 1, we can write the upper bound on LN as follows:
LN ≤ 1 + piN (e
1
N λNpiN − 1).
Therefore, (εN , 0)-differential privacy is achievable whenever 1 − piN + piN exp(1/(NλN piN )) ≤
exp(εN ), for which a sufficient condition is
εN ≥ piN exp(1/(NλNpiN )). (2.3)
As a result, for a converging sequence εN → ε there will be a family of sequences piN and λN that
ensure differential privacy.
Let first discuss the extreme cases. This estimator can be made (0, 0)-differentially private by
setting piN ≡ 1 and λN ≡ +∞, which means that the Laplace distribution for the mechanism noise
has an infinite variance. From Definition 2 we can clearly see that this estimator is not a regular
differentially private estimator. Indeed, the requirement of εN = 0 is very strong. At the other
extreme, we can consider (+∞, 0)-differential privacy which can be achieved by setting piN ≡ 1 and
λN ≡ 0. That is, the mechanism noise is zero and this estimator is consistent with (2.2) in Definition
2 with R¯(N,κ) = 2d exp(−2Nκ2/diam(Θ)2) obtained from the Hoeffding bound.
We can focus on the cases when 0 < εN < +∞. Note that we can always find a family of sequences
λN and piN such that εN ≥ piN exp(1/(NλNpiN )). In this family to ensure weak convergence of
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differentially private estimator (one of the requirements of Definition 2) , the sequence piN can
converge to any limit in [0, ε]. At the same time, the non-negative-valued sequence λN can have
limits on [0,+∞) with +∞ indicating a divergent sequence. Without a loss of generality, we assume
that sequences λN and piN are monotonic. We then consider the behavior of the resulting regular
differentially private estimator in the following series of various regimes.
Regime 1: λN → 0 ∈ (0,+∞) as N →∞.
Regime 1A. In this regime, whenever piN  1/N, the variance of the randomized estimator θ(PN , νN )
is O(1/(N piN ) + λN ) = o(1), meaning that the estimator converges weakly (and, of course, in
probability) to E[X]. Thus, the distribution of the random element τ in the limit is degenerate.
Note that in order to guarantee (εN , 0)-differential privacy, one has to choose λN → 0 slowly enough
so that (2.3) holds. Thus, for any E that consists of converging sequences (εN , 0), εN ≤ ε¯, that
satisfy (2.3) (note that εN may not converge to zero too quickly), the random set TE is degenerate
at θ0 = E[X], which means that in this regime the parameter of interest is identified. Thus, in this
case if one is willing to impose weaker privacy restrictions as N → ∞ in the sense that εN goes
to zero slowly enough, then the parameter is identified. However, even in this optimistic scenario
one has to remember that point identification is obtained given the knowledge of the asymptotic
behavior of λN and piN , which a data curator may not release in such a detail (imagine, e.g. the
data curator releasing the rate for piN but at the same time releasing only a lower bound on λN )!
Regime 1B. When lim
N→∞
N piN = c ∈ [0,+∞), the downsampled mean converges weakly to the
random variable Λ(c) = 1k
∑k
j=1Xj , where Xj are independent random variables distributed as
X and k is Poisson random variable with parameter c. Given that λN → 0, a weak limit τ of
the randomized estimator θ(PN , νN ) projected on Θ is distributed as Λ(c) projected on Θ. The
distribution of Λ(c) projected on Θ is the pseudo-identified set in this regime.
Note that in order to guarantee (εN , 0)-differential privacy, one has to choose λN → 0 much slower
than in Regime 1A to ensure that (2.3) holds. Also, those sequences (εN , 0) comprising E that
converges to zero would have to do so more slowly than in Regime 1A leading to further weakening
of differential privacy guarantees.
Regime 1C. When lim
N→∞
N piN = 0, the downsampled sample average converges weakly to a mass
point at 0. Differential privacy will be guaranteed for all sequences εN  1/N for λN converging to
0 sufficiently slow to satisfy (2.3).
Regime 2: λN → λ ∈ (0,+∞) as N →∞.
Since in this regime the variance of the mechanism noise does not diminish, one can impose stronger
differential privacy guarantees in the sense of taking sequences εN converging to zero faster than in
respective cases in Regime 1.
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Regime 2A. For any sequence piN  1/N, the downsampled sample average 1npiN
∑N
i=1 dixi converges
in probability to E[X]. Its variance is O(1/(N piN )) = o(1), which means that the Laplace noise will
dominate the asymptotic behavior of regular differentially private estimators. The randomized differ-
entially private estimator θ(PN , νN ) projected on Θ will converge weakly to Lap(E[X], λ) projected
on Θ, with this distribution being our pseudo-identified set.
Regime 2B. When lim
N→∞
N piN = c > 0, the resulting downsampled mean weakly converges to the
random variable Λ(c) = 1k
∑k
j=1Xj , where Xj are independent random variables distributed as X
and k is Poisson random variable with parameter c. As a result, the randomized estimator θ(PN , νN )
projected on Θ will converge weakly to the sum of distributions Λ(c) + Lap(0, λ) projected on Θ.
Regime 2C. When lim
N→∞
N piN = 0, the downsampled sample average converges weakly to a mass
point at 0. As a result, the variance of the additive noise dominates the distribution of the randomized
estimator θ(PN , νN ) which when projected on Θ will converge weakly to Lap(0, λ) projected on Θ.
Regime 3: λN → +∞ as N → ∞. This is the case when privacy guarantees can be strongest.
In this regime, however, the Laplace noise increasingly dominates the element of the estimator
corresponding to the sample average. The randomized differentially private estimator θ(PN , νN )
diverges as N → ∞, meaning that according to our convention, we need to consider its projection
on the parameter space Θ. The distribution of the projected estimator will concentrate on the
boundary of the parameter space. The resulting weak limit τ is discrete random variable with the
support {Argmin Θ,Argmax Θ} and taking equal probabilities.
Suppose for simplicity that E consists of one converging sequence of (εN , 0). Depending on the limit
and the rate of this sequence (ideally, from the differential privacy perspective this limit would be 0),
there may be several regimes listed above which would be compatible with this choice of differential
privacy parameters. As a result, the limiting random set TE may contain measurable selections with
distributions corresponding to those regimes. When a data curator releases the information about
the regime, this narrows down the class of regular differentially private estimators TN,E and, thus,
results in a “smaller” limiting random set TE . One has to keep in mind, however, that a data curator
may release information that will give only partial knowledge about regimes compatible with given
differential privacy restriction (as discussed above), which once again will lead to an “increase” in
TE .
In an extreme case when E consists of all converging sequence of (εN , 0), εN ≤ ε¯, we have the largest
TN,E possible that contains measurable selection with distributions collected across all the regimes.
In Section 2.2.1, we argued that the selection expectation is not a natural object to study under
differential privacy. With a limited privacy budget of a given dataset, it is impossible to construct
a function of the data that can reliably converge to an expectation of the differentially private
estimator (taken both with respect to the distribution of the data and the random element inducing
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differential privacy). For the sake of having a more comprehensive discussion, in the Appendix
we briefly discuss the properties of the selection expectation of the limiting random set TE in the
context of the example in this section. The very nature of that discussion ultimately ignores the
very important issue of the privacy budget.
2.4 Smoothness and separability of differentially private estimators
While our previous discussion considers a general, possibly non-separable form for regular differen-
tially private estimator all existing approaches to inducing differential privacy lead to much simpler
(approximately) separable estimators. We now further narrow down the class of regular differentially
private estimators to reflect this property.
DEFINITION 8. We say that regular differentially private estimator θ(PN , νN ) is smooth, if there
exists a functional ψ(·) and function aN with range on V such that
θ(PN , νN ) = ψ(PN ) + aN (νN ) + ∆N ,
with E
[(√
log 1
R¯(N,κ)
∆N
)2]
→ 0 as N →∞ for all κ > 0, where R¯(N,κ) is provided in Definition
2.
Definition 8 focuses on the regular differentially private estimators that are approximately separable
in the way they depend on the data sample and on the added noise to achieve differential privacy.
The residual ∆N is required to be “small” relative to the rate of convergence of the version of the
estimator θ(P, νN ) that is infused with the “trivial” noise that does not perturb it.
We note that for two early mechanisms that were proposed to provide differential privacy: Laplace
and Gaussian mechanisms, Definition 8 applies trivially. In Laplace mechanisms differential privacy
is achieved by the addition of the double-exponential noise νN to the original estimator and in the
Gaussian mechanism νN is the additive normal noise. In other words, by construction for both of
these mechanisms ∆N ≡ 0.
One interesting example of a popular non-separable mechanism for differential privacy is the expo-
nential mechanism developed in [37]. In application to extremum estimators, the mechanism replaces
extremum estimator θ̂ that maximizes sample objective function Q(θ ; PN ) over θ ∈ Θ with a draw
from quasi-posterior distribution implied by Q(· ; PN ). This class of estimators is directly related to
randomized estimators developed in [11]. [11] consider the case where the population analog of the
objective function Q(θ ; PN ) satisfies the information matrix equality. To form the estimator they
propose to consider a prior distribution pi(·) over θ and a quasi-likelihood function exp (Q(θ ; PN )) (so
that the original objective function is quasi-log-likelihood function). Then the estimator is a mean
of quasi-posterior distribution ∝ exp (Q(θ ; PN )) pi(θ) which consistently estimates the maximizer
of the population objective function regardless of the shape of the prior distribution pi(·) (under
mild regularity conditions). Moreover, the variance of this quasi-posterior distribution accurately
estimates the asymptotic variance of the original extremum estimator. A significant advantage of
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this estimator over the original extremum estimator θ̂ is that it does not require maximization of
potentially non-smooth or hard to optimize function Q(θ ; PN ).
In the follow-up work in [29] for the cases where Q(θ ; PN ) may be steep in the vicinity of the
maximum, which may lead to slow convergence of the simulations required to sample from the quasi-
posterior, it is proposed to scale the exponent in the pseudo-likelihood function as exp (λQ(θ ; PN ))
using a constant λ which is selected based on the speed of mixing of the simulated Markov Chain
(produced using the new pseudo-posterior). The corresponding posterior mean remains a consistent
estimator for the maximizer of the population objective function while its asymptotic variance can
be estimated by scaling the variance of the quasi-posterior using λ.
The exponential mechanism for differential privacy considered in [37] is a simple implementation of
the idea in [11]: the estimator is a single draw from the quasi-posterior ∝ exp(λQ(θ ; PN ))pi(θ).
The resulting estimator turns out to be (λ,∆Q , 0)-differentially private, where
∆Q = sup
θ∈Θ, PN ,P′N
|Q(θ ; P′N )−Q(θ ; PN )|
is the global sensitivity of the objective function Q(θ ; PN ) evaluated over all empirical distributions
P′N that are different from PN in any one single support point.
[11] and later [29] focus on the cases where Q(θ ; PN ) is stochastically equicontinuous and the quasi-
posterior is asymptotically equivalent to
∝ exp
(
−1
2
λ(θ − θ̂)′H (θ − θ̂) + op(‖θ − θ̂‖2)
)
,
where H is the Hessian of the population objective function. This means that a single draw from
this quasi-posterior, corresponding to the exponential mechanism for differential privacy can be
represented as
θ˜ = θ̂ + λ ξ + op(1),
where ξ is a multivariate normal random vector with mean zero and covariance matrix H−1. The
extremum estimator θ̂ is only depends on the data distribution PN and is not affected by the noise.
Therefore, the exponential mechanism is smooth in the sense of Definition 8.
We now present a simple lemma that outlines the additive representation of smooth differentially
private estimators which we will use in our applications.
LEMMA 3. Consider additive randomized estimator θ∗(PN , νN ) = ψ(PN ) + aN (νN ), where
• For each κ > 0, lim
N→∞
P (|ψ(PN )− θ0| > κ) = 0
• aN (0) = 0 for all N.
Then estimator θ∗(PN , νN ) is regular in the sense of Definition 2. Moreover for any converging
sequence (εN , δN ) and any smooth (εN , δN )- differentially private estimator θ(PN , νN ) (i.e. as in
Definition 8) there exists an asymptotically equivalent regular estimator θ∗(PN , νN ),
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This lemma, which follows from our smoothness definition, allows us to focus our further analysis
on such separable estimators. Given the asymptotic equivalence, the set of weak limits of these
estimators coincides with the target random set TE .
We now move on to analyzing performance of smooth differentially private estimators in some
important econometric models.
3 Regression discontinuity design
Regression discontinuity design is an important empirical tool for estimation of treatment effects in
a variety of disciplines. The literature on RDD goes back to the work by [48]. A lot of important
theoretical and empirical work on RDD has emerged in Economics the last two decades, with too
many papers to list here. For a general review of this literature, see [19], [22], [31], [10].
In the usual setting for the RD design, the object of interest is the causal effect of binary treatment
on the outcome and units are either exposed or not exposed to a treatment. The effect of the
treatment can be heterogenous across units but we will focus on the case of when this effect is
homogeneous as our main goal is to highlight the loss of identification of of the treatment effect in
these models when estimator is subject to differential privacy guarantees.
Following the tradition of the treatment effect literature, we let Y0 and Y1 denote the pair of potential
outcomes (without the treatment with exposure to the treatment, respectively) and the actual
treatment denoted by Y and defined as
Y = W · Y1 + (1−W ) · Y0,
where W is the treatment indicator. The goal is to evaluate the average treatment effect (ATE) of
the treatment. The observables are (W,Y,X), where X is a pre-treatment covariate (the so-called
forcing or running variable).
We first give a review of two main designs used in this literature. We then formulate conditions
under which differentially private mechanism applied to traditional RDD methods leads to the lack
of identification of the treatment effect. We then show that these situations of non-identifiability
will be generic due to the global sensitivity of RDD estimators being bounded away from zero even
as the sample size increases. These findings no doubt will be of interest to researchers as usually
RD design is considered to be one of the most credible identification strategies for causal inference
and it loses this powerful feature under differential privacy.
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3.1 Overview
3.1.1 Sharp regression discontinuity design
In the sharp design there is a deterministic relation between the running variable and the treatment
indicator:
W = 1(X ≥ c),
and the average causal effect β is given by the discontinuity in the conditional expectation of the
outcome given the covariate effect of the treatment:
β = lim
X↓c
E[W |X]− lim
X↑c
E[W |X].
Even though sometimes researchers rely on parametric methods by estimating, for instance, the
linear model
Y = α+ γW + β ·W + δ ·DW + ε
(or analogous models with more polynomial terms), these approaches may work poorly in practice
due to their reliance on a functional form.
The state-of-the art methods are local and rely on learning β from a small neighborhood of c, the size
of which becomes increasingly smaller as the sample size increases. In other words, these approaches
rely on employing only observations in a small neighborhood (c−h, c+h) of c, where the size of the
neighborhood is described by bandwidth h = h(N) that depends on sample size N , where h(N)→ 0
as N →∞. Such estimators can be roughly classified into two categories: nonparametric regression
at the boundary and local linear regression.
Nonparametric regression at the boundary This method selects a kernel K(·) and takes the
estimator
τˆS,NR = τˆr(c)− τˆl(c), (3.1)
where
τˆr(c) =
∑
Xi≥c Yi ·K
(
Xi−c
h
)∑
Xi≥cK
(
Xi−c
h
) , τˆl(c) = ∑Xi<c Yi ·K (Xi−ch )∑
Xi<c
K
(
Xi−c
h
)
for a chosen bandwidth h = h(N). Even though this estimator is quite intuitive, it has well-known
drawbacks particularly with respect to the bias term being linear in bandwidth, as discussed in [19],
[43] and [22], among others. Nevertheless, it is instructive for us to analyze a differentially private
version of this estimator.
Local linear regression This method conducts two optimization problems by fitting linear re-
gression functions to the observations within an h-neighborhood on either side of the discontinuity
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point:
(α̂L, β̂L) = arg min
αL,βL
∑
i:Xi<c
K
(
Xi − c
h
)
(Yi − αL − βL(Xi − c))2,
(α̂R, β̂R) = arg min
αR,βR
∑
i:c≤Xi
K
(
Xi − c
h
)
(Yi − αR − βR(Xi − c))2,
and then estimating the average treatment effect as
τ̂S,LocLin = α̂R − α̂L. (3.2)
The asymptotic properties of this estimator can be found e.g. in [19], among others, and they are
based on the theory in [16] and [17].
There is a significant literature that analyzes the properties and performance of these estimators
as well as the choice of the bandwidth and the construction of confidence sets. These issues, even
though important, are not immediately relevant to our research question which is to illustrate that
a generic differential privacy algorithm will prevent researchers to be able to to identify the average
treatment effect in RD design in the limit of statistical experiments. We aim to keep the discussion
as general as possible without focusing on just one specific local estimation approach.
3.1.2 Fuzzy regression discontinuity design
In the fuzzy RD design, there is a a jump in the probability of assignment to the treatment at the
threshold:
lim
x↑c
P (Wi = 1|Xi = x) 6= lim
x↓c
P (Wi = 1|Xi = x) ,
and average treatment effect in defined as
τFRD =
lim
x↓c
E[Y |X = x]− lim
x↑c
E[Y |X = x]
lim
x↓c
P (W = 1|X = x)− lim
x↑c
P (W = 1|X = x) .
One way to estimate τFRD would be to use the estimator in (3.1). As first pointed out by [19], in the
context of the fuzzy design this estimator is a Wald estimator or, in other words, the IV estimator
that treats Wi as an endogenous regressor and the indicator 1(Xi ≥ c) as an instrument.
The local linear regression estimator is defined as
τ̂F,LocLin =
α̂y,R − α̂y,L
α̂w,R − α̂w,L , (3.3)
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where the objects on the right-hand side are obtained from the following estimations:(
α̂y,L, β̂y,L
)
= arg min
αy,L,βy,L
∑
i:c−hN≤Xi<c
(Yi − αy,L − βy,L(Xi − c))2,(
α̂y,R, β̂y,R
)
= arg min
αy,R,βy,R
∑
i:c≤Xi≤c+hN
(Yi − αy,R − βy,R(Xi − c))2,(
α̂w,L, β̂w,L
)
= arg min
αw,L,βw,L
∑
i:c−hN≤Xi<c
(Wi − αw,L − βw,L(Xi − c))2,(
α̂w,R, β̂w,R
)
= arg min
αw,R,βw,R
∑
i:c≤Xi≤c+hN
(Wi − αw,R − βw,R(Xi − c))2.
As is well known, this estimator can be interpreted as the IV estimator with the main equation
being the regression of Yi on exogenous constant, 1 (Xi − c < 0) (Xi− c), 1 (Xi − c ≥ 0) (Xi− c) and
endogenous Wi, while using the indicator 1(Xi ≥ c) as the excluded instrument. This estimator
can, of course, be easily generalized to include more polynomial terms in each estimation. In the
definition of α̂y,L, α̂y,R and α̂w,L, α̂w,R we, for simplicity, used the uniform kernel. However, one
could use other kernels.
3.2 Asymptotic behavior of global sensitivity and parameter non-identifiability
In this section, we establish general results that connect the asymptotic behavior of the global
sensitivity with the inconsistency of regular differentially private estimators, allowing us, in light
of our notion of identification in Section 2, to make conclusions about the non-identifiability of the
parameter of interest under differentially private mechanisms.
We consider smooth estimators as given in Definition 8. The smoothness property allows us to
essentially consider estimators with an additive mechanism noise ξN :
θ̂ = ψ(PN ) + ξN (3.4)
(as discussed in the introduction, νN in the Definitions 2 and 8, among others, play the role of the
“seed” and, thus, the actual independent from the data additive noise ξN is a transformation of νN ).
For this estimator to satisfy regularity requirements in Definition 2, it has to, among other things,
be consistent in the absence of any mechanism noise, thus giving the identification of the parameter
in the limit of statistical experiments. This immediately leads us to the condition that
ψ(PN )
p→ θ0, (3.5)
where θ0 denotes the true parameter value.
Suppose the family from which the distribution of ξN is drawn is described by the density fN ;σ2 ,
where σ2 denotes the variance (the actual value of σ2 in practice depend on the sample size). The
notation fN ;σ2 is not meant to say that the distributional family for the additive noise is fully
described by the variance parameter. This parameter is introduced explicitly in the notation as
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usually the situations when differentially private mechanisms do not prevent the identification of θ0
in the limit are characterized the behavior of this parameter as the sample size increases.5 Even
though for now we consider just one distributional family, one has to keep in mind that potentially
several different distributions could be used, in which one has to consider all of them. To keep this
exposition simple, we will focus on one family fσ2 , as this already will give us a rather comprehensive
analysis.
For any ∆ > 0, σ2 and a < b, define
DN (∆, σ2, a, b) ≡ sup
z∈[a,b]
| log fN ;σ2(z)− log fN ;σ2(z + ∆)|, (3.6)
which is the discrepancy between the logarithms of two densities with a fixed variance, from which
one is calculated with a shifts ∆, on some interval [a, b]. As can be seen from the Definition 1 of
differential privacy, the behaviour of this object across different ∆ and σ2 is directly related to the
parameters of the differential privacy. The properties of a density imply that if [a, b] is large enough,
then for a fixed sample size N we have
DN (∆, σ2, a, b)→ +∞ as σ2 → 0, ∆ 6= 0. (3.7)
In the majority of applications the family of distributions fN ;σ2 is not indexed by N and the change
in the distribution of the estimators with the sample size may be driven by different variances. In
fact, this is the case for all commonly used mechanisms – Laplace, Gaussian, exponential mechanisms
and their variations. To make our discussion more general, we can allow for different distributional
families across different N , in which case we will require the following
Algorithm condition 1 (AC1). For any ∆, σ2 and a < b
sup
N
DN (∆, σ2, a, b) ≤ D(∆, σ2, a, b) (3.8)
D(∆, σ2, a, b)→ +∞ as σ2 → 0, ∆ 6= 0. (3.9)
As is clear from the discussion later, in the differential privacy implementation ∆ will be associated
with with the global sensitivity of ψ(PN ). Condition AC1 tells us that if the global sensitivity
remains bounded away from 0 as the sample size increases, then the diminishing variance of the
noise and (N , δN ), N ≤ ¯, δN ≤ δ¯ differential privacy guarantees are incompatible with each other.
This will allow us to immediately draw conclusions about the situation of non-identifiability in the
limit of statistical experiments of the parameter of interest.
We give another algorithmic condition on the family of the distribution of the noise variable, which
holds generally for differentially private mechanisms and which also help to establish further results
related to the identifiability (or lack of such) of the parameter.
5For very popular mean-zero Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms, the distribution of ξN is fully characterized by
the variance parameter.
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Algorithm condition 2 (AC2). For any ∆N → 0 as N → ∞, it is possible to indicate σ2N → 0
and [aN , bN ] such that
H ([aN , bN ],R)→ 0
and
D(∆N , σ2N , aN , bN )→ 0, (3.10)
where D(∆, σ2, a, b) is as defined in (3.10).
To give an example, consider the Laplace mechanism (discussed in Example 1) and note that
log f2λ2(z + ∆) = − |z+∆|λ , and thus,
D(∆, σ2, a, b) ≤ |∆|
λ
,
which in particular implies that we can even take a = −∞ and b = +∞ in AC2. We can see that
this case trivially satisfies AC2 and, of course, condition AC1 if one chooses the Laplace mechanism
for any N .
It is exactly condition AC2 that would give a hope for the identifiability of the parameter of interest
in cases when global sensitivity of ψ(PN ) goes to 0. Indeed, the convergence ∆N → 0 is meant to
capture the case when the global sensitivity of the estimator converges to zero.
When this happens, condition AC2 says that it is possible to take σ2N → 0 and [aN , bN ] converging
to the whole real line at the right rates (which clearly depend on the rate of a decreasing global
sensitivity) in such a way that D(µ1,N , µ2,N , σ2N , aN , bN ) remains bounded by a small εN → 0 with
the probability of at least 1 − δN . This will ensure that the differentially privacy criteria will be
satisfied for some sequences N , δN ) converging to (0, 0) while delivering consistent differentially
private estimator. This is given in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. Consider a smooth (N , δN )-differentially private estimator – without a loss of
generality represented as (3.4), – and suppose that in the absence of the mechanism noise this
estimator (denotes as ψ(PN )) is consistent, i.e. (3.5) holds. Suppose that the global sensitivity of
ψ(PN ) denoted as G(N) converges to 0 with the sample size and the mean on ξN converges to 0. If
AC2 holds, then the differentially private estimator is consistent if N and δN both converging to 0
have slow enough rates.
Note that under the conditions of Proposition 1 implies that an (, δ)-differentially private estimator
is consistent for fixed (, δ) as well since these requirements are weaker than requiring that (N , δN )
converges to 0. The result of Proposition 1 gives a hope that the parameter of interest can be
identified in the limit of experiments with a suitable choice of the set E of sequences (N , δN ).
Our next step is to establish that a generic (εN , δN )-differentially private algorithm will give an
inconsistent estimator if the global sensitivity remains bounded away from zero as the sample size
increases even if the mean of the mechanism noise ξN converges to 0.
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THEOREM 4. Consider a smooth (N , δN )-differentially private estimator θ̂ – without a loss
of generality represented as (3.4), – and suppose that in the absence of the mechanism noise this
estimator (denoted as ψ(PN )) is consistent, i.e. (3.5) holds. Suppose that AC1 holds and the global
sensitivity of ψ(PN ) denoted as G(N) does not converge to 0 with the sample size whereas the mean
on ξN converges to 0.
Then this (N , δN )-differentially private estimator is inconsistent even if N does not change with
N .
We end this section by giving sufficient condition for when the parameter of interest is not identified
from the differential privacy estimation in the limit of statistical experiments.
COROLLARY 1. Consider a class of smooth (N , δN )-differentially private estimators θ̂ – without
a loss of generality represented as (3.4), – and suppose that in the absence of the mechanism noise
these estimators (correspond to ψ(PN )) are consistent, i.e. (3.5) holds. Suppose that AC1 holds and
the global sensitivity of ψ(PN ) denoted as G(N) does not converge to 0 with the sample size whereas
the mean on ξN converges to 0.
For any join-semilattice E of sequences of (N , δN ), with N ≤ ¯, δN ≤ δ¯, parameter θ0 is not
identified in the limit of experiments.
This corollary directly follows from Theorem 4.
3.3 Regression discontinuity under differential privacy
In this section, we use results of Section 3.2 to analyze the identifiability of the average treatment
effect of differentially private regression discontinuity design estimators. Even though this section
will be focused on the issue of identifiability, there are other important issues one would want to
explore in the RDD framework. One of these issues is the question of how differential privacy
requirements would affect the visual analysis of the data, which is on e of the fundamental steps
in the practice of RDD. Another issue is the the question of the credibility of specification tests
(continuity of the density of the running variable at the cut-off, placebo tests with pre-treatment
covariates), under differential privacy. Even though our main focus is on identifiability of the average
treatment effect under differential privacy, we do discuss these other related issues in Section 3.4
albeit in less detail.
Even though sometimes there are some parametric RDD estimation methods which are global in
nature, the state-of-the-art RDD techniques are local in nature and employ some elements of non-
parametric methods. These latter methods focus on a neighborhood around the switch point with the
size of this neighborhood being determined by a kernel K(·) and a respective bandwidth h = h(N).
We will suppose that h(N) is chosen by a certain differential privacy algorithm according to some
rule in such a way that h(N) = o(1) as N → ∞. Then the expected number of observations from
a sample of size N in a right-hand side neighborhood of c is N · Pr (c ≤ X < c+ h(N)), and in the
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left-hand side neighborhood is N · Pr (c− h(N) < X < c). There are, of course, some well known
approaches for selecting a bandwidth, such as [21], [9], among others. Our analysis will apply to
general bandwidth choices subject.
3.3.1 Sharp RD under differential privacy
We start with the analysis of differentially private RDD estimators for the sharp design. We begin
our series of formal results with establishing the results on the global sensitivity of nonparamet-
ric regression at the boundary and local linear (polynomial) estimation. Propositions 2-4 look at
nonparametric regression at the boundary and various properties of kernels that affect the global
sensitivity result. Proposition 5 looks at the local linear estimation. In light of the results in Section
3.2, the knowledge of the asymptotic behavior of the global sensitivity of these estimators will allow
us to analyze wether smooth differentially private approaches are compatible with the identifiability
of the ATE of interest. As we show, the exact results on the global sensitivity even depend on the
type of kernel used in the above-mentioned estimation techniques.
Before formulate to Proposition 2, we formulate what we mean by kernels with a bounded support.
DEFINITION 9. We say that the kernel function K(·) : R → R+ has a bounded support if there
is a value u0 > 0 such that K(u) = 0 when |u| > u0. If this condition is not satisfied, then we will
say that the kernel has an unbounded support.
Uniform, Epanechnikov, triangular kernels are examples of kernel functions with bounded supports.
Gaussian and logistic kernels are examples of kernel functions with unbounded supports. Even if
one considers kernels with a bounded support, we will see that it will make a difference whether the
kernel is continuous (like the triangular kernel) or has discontinuities (like the uniform kernel).
DEFINITION 10. For a given kernel function K(·) with a bounded support and a given bandwidth
h, we define a K-h-neighborhood to the right of c as a set [c, c+ ∆K,r(h)), where ∆K,r(h) > 0, such
that K(u−ch ) > 0 for u > c if and only if u ∈ [c, c+ ∆r(h)). In other words, this is the set of point
to the right of c that will be used in the nonparametric regression.
Analogously, we define a K-h-neighborhood to the left of c as a set (c−∆K,l(h), c), where ∆K,l(h) > 0,
such that K(u−ch ) > 0 for u < c if and only if u ∈ (c−∆K,l(h), c).
A differentially private algorithm takes the support of the observed variables as given and usually
depends on this support, and thus, uses the supports of Y in both right-hand side and left-hand side
K-h-neighborhoods as inputs. For a kernel with a bounded support, these supports can be denoted
as Yr(h) and Y l(h), respectively, and may generally depend on h. However, they are naturally
approximated by
Yr = lim
h↓0
Yr(h) and Y l = lim
h↓0
Y l(h) (3.11)
that no longer depend on the bandwidth choice (these limits are well defined as {Yr(h)} and {Y l(h)}
are sequences of monotonically decreasing events.)
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We will suppose that Yr and Y l are convex non-singleton sets. As further notations, we will use
Y
r
= supYr, Y r = inf Yr,
Y
l
= supY l, Y l = inf Y l.
We now present a series of results on the global sensitivity.
Proposition 2. Consider a nonparametric regression at the boundary estimator that uses a con-
tinuous kernel with a bounded support.
Suppose that for a data-driven choice of bandwidth h = h(N), for any sample size N it is possible to
have realizations of the data {(Yi,Wi, Xi)}Ni=1 that will deliver the minimum number of observations
mr(N) ≥ 1 in the K-h-neighborhood to the right of c and the minimum number of observations
ml(N) ≥ 1 in the K-h-neighborhood to the left of c.
(a) If the supports Yr and Y l are bounded, then the global sensitivity of the nonparametric regres-
sion at the boundary estimator is
Y
r − Y r + Y l − Y l
and, hence, it does not depend on the sample size.
(b) If at least one of the supports Yr and Y l is unbounded, the global sensitivity of of the nonpara-
metric regression at the boundary estimator is +∞.
We next consider the case of a kernel function with a bounded support and discontinuities at the
support boundaries −u0 and u0 with the main example here being the uniform kernel. We define
K ≡ inf
u∈(−u0,u0)
K(u). (3.12)
The discontinuities of K(·) at −u0 and u0 imply that K > 0. For expositional simplicity, in the
formulation of Proposition 3 we only indicate the rate of the global sensitivity. However, the proof
of this proposition in the Appendix gives the exact expression for this sensitivity.
Proposition 3. Consider a nonparametric regression at the boundary that uses a kernel with a
bounded support and K > 0, where K is as defined in 3.12.
Suppose that for a data-driven choice of bandwidth h, for any sample size N it is somehow possible
to guarantee the minimum number of observations mr(N) ≥ 1 in the K-h-neighborhood to the right
of c and the minimum number of observations ml(N) ≥ 1 in the K-h-neighborhood to the left of c.
(a) If the supports Yr and Y l are bounded are bounded, then the global sensitivity of the nonpara-
metric regression at the boundary estimator is proportional to 1
min{mr(N),ml(N)} .
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(b) If at least one of the supports Yr or Y l is unbounded, the global sensitivity of of the nonpara-
metric regression at the boundary estimator is +∞.
Part (a) in Proposition 3 seemingly gives some hope of achieving the situation when the global
sensitivity may be going to zero as N → ∞ if it can be ensured that min{mr(N),ml(N)} → ∞.
This hope, however, is a false one as the situation of being able to guarantee a minimal number
(growing to ∞) of observations in each neighborhood for any sample {Xi}Ni=1 with a given support
of X is a rather hypothetical scenario as the probabilities that the number of observations in the
right- and left-hand side neighborhoods is strictly less than mr(N) and ml(N), respectively:
mr(N)∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
FX(c)
N−k (1− FX(c))k
is the probability of fewer than mr(N) observations to the right of c,
ml(N)∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
FX(c)
k (1− FX(c))N−k
is the probability of fewer than ml(N) observations to the left of c.
Both these probabilities are clearly strictly positive when c is an interior point of the support of X.
The non-stochastic nature of the global sensitivity concept effectively leads to the situation of the
global sensitivity always being bounded away from 0 as N → ∞ in the case of the kernel with a
bounded support and K > 0.
Our final case is that of a kernel with an unbounded support, that is, the kernel is strictly positive
on the whole real line and approaches 0 at ±∞ (such as the Gaussian kernel). In this case we will
take that a differentially private algorithm uses the supports of Y |X ≥ c and Y |X < c since the
kernel weights are technically never equal to zero. Let’s denote these supports as Yrall and Y lall,
respectively.6 Also denote
Y
r
all = supYrall, Y rall = inf Yrall,
Y
l
all = supY lall, Y lall = inf Y lall.
Since the kernel approaches zero arbitrarily closely, the global sensitivity results for this case will
be similar to those in Proposition 4 where the infimum of the values of the kernel on its support
bounded support is 0.
Proposition 4. Consider a nonparametric regression at the boundary that uses a kernel function
with a unbounded support.
6Potentially differentially private algorithms may use more a complicated support for Y |X that could depend on
X. This is not going to change our qualitative findings on the global sensitivity being bounded away from 0, even
though the exact numerical values for global sensitivities may be different.
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(a) If the supports Yrall and Y lall are bounded, then the global sensitivity of a nonparametric regres-
sion at the boundary estimator is
Y
r
all − Y rall + Y
l
all − Y lall
– that is, it does not depend on the sample size.
(b) If at least one of the supports of Yrall and Y lall is unbounded, then the global sensitivity of a
nonparametric regression at the boundary estimator is +∞.
Thus, the results of Propositions 2-4 and the discussion following Proposition 3 lead us to con-
clude that the global sensitivity of a nonparametric at boundary estimator is always bounded away
from zero. The implications of this for asymptotic properties of differentially private estimators
is given in Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 allow us to conclude that the ATE is not identified in the
limit of statistical experiments of smooth differentially private nonparametric regression at boundary
estimators.
Our next step is to analyze whether things get better with a local linear (and more generally,
polynomial) estimator as defined in (3.2). Proposition 5 below establishes that this is not the case
and the global sensitivity of this estimator is in fact infinite even if the support of the outcome
variable is bounded.
Proposition 5. Consider the local linear estimator as defined in (3.2). The global sensitivity of
this estimator is bounded away from zero as N →∞.
Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 allow us to conclude that the ATE is not identified in the limit of
statistical experiments of smooth differentially private local linear estimators.
Our findings for the sharp design are summarized in Theorem 5.
THEOREM 5. In the sharp regression discontinuity design case, any smooth (εN , δN )-differentially
private nonparametric regression at the boundary estimator and any smooth (εN , δN )-differentially
private local linear estimator is inconsistent for any bounded sequences of positive {εN} and non-
negative {δN}.
If we add other covariates to our estimation or use more terms in the local polynomial estimation, the
conclusion of Theorem 5 remains exactly the same, even though in Propositions 2-5 quantitatively
the global sensitivities of the estimators could be different. Indeed, from the proofs in the Appendix
one could easily see that the global sensitivity for the local polynomial estimator would once again
rely on the formula for the OLS estimator for the intercept whereas in the nonparametric regression
at the boundary estimator the lower bounds on global sensitivities could be obtained in the same
way as the proofs in Propositions 2-4.
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3.3.2 Fuzzy RD under differential privacy
In the case of the fuzzy design the results for the global sensitivities of the estimators are analogous
to the sharp design case. Naturally, we are also able the conclude that differentially pirate versions
of traditional estimators in this framework are inconsistent.
Indeed, as discussed in Section 3.1.2, the estimator (3.1) may be used in the fuzzy design case as
well, with the asymptotic properties analogous to the sharp design scenario. The global sensitivity
of this estimator remains the same and, therefore, its properties are described by Propositions 2-4.
As for the local linear estimator, the result is the same, once again, even though the proof is slightly
more elaborate than in the sharp design case. For the sake of completeness, we establish this result
formally in Proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6. Consider the local linear estimator as defined in (3.3). The global sensitivity of
this estimator is bounded away from 0 as N →∞.
The proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix for simplicity does not employ other covariates. It is
worth mentioning, however, that the situation with other covariates (let’s call them Si with the
support S) may be even worse as in the case we may have that
inf
SiS
∣∣∣∣limx↑c P (Wi = 1|Xi = x) 6= limx↓c P (Wi = 1|Xi = x)
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
If this situation occurs, then even in the nonparametric regression at the boundary type of estimators
the global sensitivities may be converging to ∞ as N → ∞, giving even more severe implications
for the asymptotic properties of smooth differentially private estimators.
In the definition of the local linear estimator in Section 3.1.2 we for simplicity used the uniform
kernel. However, the result of Proposition 6 remains true of other kernels are used.
Then, relying on the results in Propositions 2-5, 6 and Theorem 4, we can immediately obtain the
result of Theorem 6 below.
THEOREM 6. In fuzzy regression discontinuity design, any smooth (εN , δN )-differentially private
nonparametric regression at the boundary estimator and any smooth (εN , δN )-differentially private
local linear estimator is inconsistent for any bounded sequences of positive {εN} and non-negative
{δN}.
To summarize the results of Theorems 5 and 6 in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, in the sharp and fuzzy
regression discontinuity design the requirements of (ε, δ)-differential privacy either with fixed ε, δ or
with these parameters decreasing with the sample size are incompatible with the consistent estimation
of the average treatment effect. Therefore, given our notion of identifiability in Section 2, they are
also incompatible with the identifiability of the average treatment effect in the limit of statistical
experiments.
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3.4 Specification testing
So far we mostly have focused on the non-identifiability of the average treatment effect under smooth
differentially private mechanisms. However, every regression discontinuity design analysis is tradi-
tionally accompanied by specification testing. This includes checking for the possibility of other
changes at the cutoff value c of the forcing variable Xi and also checking for the manipulation of Xi.
The first type of checks include testing the null hypothesis of a zero average effect on pseudo outcomes
known not to be affected by the treatment. The outcomes of such placebo tests would also have to
be (εN , δN )-differentially private. A traditional differentially private literature approach in this case
would add noise to the true test statistic and then adjust the asymptotic distribution to compute
correct p-values (see e.g. [49]).7 It is not surprising that, once again, this brings a range of issues
in the context of placebo tests in regression discontinuity designs. Indeed, let τ̂pl denote the true
regression discontinuity design estimator in the analysis of treatment of pseudo-outcomes, and let
τpl denote the true parameter. The testing of the null H0 : τpl = 0 is based on the t-ratio
τ̂pl
se(τ̂pl)
.
Without giving formal results on this, we nevertheless want to point out that utilizing our techniques
in the proofs of Propositions 2-5 and 6, we can establish that the global sensitivity of this ratio either
increases to ∞ with the sample size or is already ∞ in a finite sample. This implies that the noise
added to this ratio would asymptotically dominate this ratio. Even if the critical values are corrected
to account for the added noise, it is clear that the conclusion of the (εN , δN )-differentially private
test based on such a procedure are not credible and, in particular, result in a lower power of the
test (in the limit, the power of this test is trivial). To make our point more transparent, let us focus
on a stylized version of the test when the asymptotic variance of
√
Nh (τ̂pl − τpl) is known. We will
denote is as Avar (τ̂pl). In this stylized version we want to create a differentially private version of
the test statistic tN =
√
Nhτ̂pl√
Avar(τ̂pl)
.
As we have shown in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, the global sensitivity of τ̂pl may be constant and
bounded away from zero or may even be infinite for every N (in situations when we add other
covariates, it may be increasing to ∞ wth the sample size). Given that h = h(N) is chosen in a way
to give Nh → ∞, this will imply immediately that the global sensitivity of tN is either increasing
to infinity with the sample size or is infinite. This means that the variance of the independent noise
added in the differentially private algorithm will increasingly dominate the asymptotically constant
variance of tN . Instead of using the standard normal distribution critical values, one would take the
critical values from the distribution that suitably combines the standard normal distribution and
the distribution of noise. However, as N increases, the testing essentially becomes inference about
the mechanism noise, leading to a decreasing power of the test, which asymptotically diminishes to
the trivial power. 8
7There are also approaches to hypotheses testing in the differential privacy literature that are based on adding
noise to the inputs – see e.g. [23]. They. may, however, be considered less reliable than the approaches based on the
output perturbation.
8In contrast, in a simpler case of the estimation of mean, as in Example 1, the global sensitivity of t-ratio would
be finite and bounded away from zero as N increases. Upon the correction of the critical values, in this situation the
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A second type of tests are for the manipulation of the forcing variable. We will illustrate issues
associated with (ε, δ)-differentially private versions of these tests by considering the test of the
continuity of the density at cutoff by [36]. The test is based on the ratio θ̂σ̂θ , where
θ̂ = ln f̂+ − ln f̂−, σ̂θ =
√
1
Nh
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5
(
1
f̂+
+
1
f̂−
)
,
where h is the bandwidth and
f̂+ =
∑
Xi>c
K
(
Xi − c
h
)
S+N,2 − S+N,1(Xi − c)
S+N,2S
+
N,0 −
(
S+N,1
)2Yi = ∑
Xi>c
K
(
Xi−c
h
)
M+N
S+N,2
M+N
− S
+
N,1
M+N
(Xi − c)
S+N,2
M+N
S+N,0
M+N
−
(
S+N,1
M+N
)2Yi, (3.13)
f̂− =
∑
Xi<c
K
(
Xi − c
h
)
S−N,2 − S−N,1(Xi − c)
S−N,2S
−
N,0 −
(
S−N,1
)2Yi = ∑
Xi<c
K
(
Xi−c
h
)
M−N
S−N,2
M−N
− S
−
N,1
M−N
(Xi − c)
S−N,2
M−N
S−N,0
M−N
−
(
S−N,1
M−N
)2Yi, (3.14)
where M+N =
∑
Xi>c
K
(
Xi−c
h
)
, S+N,k =
∑
Xi>c
K ((Xi − c)/h) (Xi−c)2 and analogous definition for
the objects with the minus superscript. In the rewritten expression for f̂+ and f̂− on the right-hand
side of (3.13) and (3.14), we can see that these definitions are weighted averages with the weights
K((Xi−c)/h)
M+N
and K((Xi−c)/h)
M−N
, respectively. This brings us to the situations analogous to the ones
in Propositions 2-4 and, thus, allows us to analyze the behavior of the global sensitivities of θ̂ and
the ratio θ̂σ̂θ using similar tools. Even if only one observation in a sample changes, these weights
may vary from 0 to 1 for continuous kernels with abounded support (like in Proposition 2) and for
kernels with an unbounded support (like in Proposition 4), and they may vary within a range that is
bounded away from 0 for kernels with a bounded support and K described in Proposition 3. These
are exactly the features that would allow us to establish that the global sensitivity of θ̂ is bounded
away from zero (may even be infinite in some situations) as N →∞ and the global sensitivity of θ̂σ̂θ
goes to∞ (or may even be infinite for a finite N) as N →∞. This implies that for smooth estimators
the independent mechanism noise combined with the test statistic θ̂σ̂θ to make such a ratio (εN , δN )-
differentially private, will dominate the asymptotic behavior of the differentially private ratio. Even
if the critical values are corrected by taking into account the distribution of the mechanism noise,
the conclusions of this test are not credible and the power of the test is very low (in the limit, the
power of this test is trivial).
3.5 Graphical analyses
Graphical analyses have become an essential part of regression discontinuity design applications as
they give a powerful way to visualize the identification strategy of the RD design. [22], among
others, summarizes three type of analyses particularly useful.
significance testing would still have non-trivial power even though the power of the test would be lower.
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The first one is the histogram-type estimate of the average value of the outcome for different values
of the forcing variable. Usually, the support of the forcing variable is split into a number of equal-
sized bins, with first bins being defined at the cut-point and then taken further to the right and to
the left. It is essential that no bin mounts over the cut-off point, as this graph is meant to provide a
visual guidance about whether there is in fact a discontinuity at the cut-off. In addition, it allows to
analyze whether there is evidence of jumps at points other than the cut-off, thus helping to analyze
whether or not the jump at the cut-off can be solely attributed to the treatment of interest (see the
discussion in [31]). In an nutshell, in this analysis one would want to plot the average bin values
Yk =
∑N
i=1 Yi · 1 (bk < Xi ≤ bk+1)∑N
i=1 1 (bk < Xi ≤ bk+1)
against the average points bk+bk+12 of bins [bk, bk+1].
The differentially private literature has developed a variety of methods for outputting differentially
private histograms (for a review see e.g. [38]). Starting with first papers on differentially private
histograms (such as [35]), it has been recognized that the partitioning can leak information about
the data and for that reason usually the data are split into bins using a privacy-preserving clustering
algorithm that is compatible with differential privacy, such as the k-means algorithm or similar.
This means that usually the bins would be chosen by an algorithm rather than a data curator or
a researcher. in such a situation in general the cut-off point will not be the separator of two of
the bins, and when it is not, then the main purpose of this visual analysis is defeated. In case a
researcher wants to impose restrictions that the cut-off is a separator of the two bins, then the issues
encountered under these restrictions will be similar to the ones in the nonparametric regression at
the boundary estimation with the uniform kernel (see Proposition 3). In particular, this means
that generally the global sensitivity of means in the bins next to the threshold does not converge to
zero with the sample size, implying that in any (εN , δN )-differentially private histogram-like output
for conditional means of the outcome the impact of the mechanism noise will be persistent for any
sample size, leading to the lack of credibility of such an analysis.
The second type of analyses is similar to the first one but plots average bin values of other covariates
against the average points of bin values. These types of graphs are useful in detecting potential spec-
ification problems. The issues with delivering differentially private graphs are completely analogous
to those described in the first type of analyses above.
Finally, the third type of analyses plots the histogram of the distribution of the forcing variable as
this helps to inspect whether there is a discontinuity in the distribution of the forcing variable at the
cut-off and, thus, to analyze whether there is any manipulation of the forcing variable. As argued
in [31], it is preferable to use histograms rather than smoothed density estimates as histograms can
provide a sense in which any jump at the threshold is unusual. Once again, the issues with making
these type of histograms differentially private are the same as before: a) usually the bins would
be chosen by a mechanisms adaptively and therefore generally one the bins will contain the cut-off
point as an interior point thus defeating the purpose of this visualization; b) if a researcher asks for
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separate histograms to the right and to the left of the cut-off, this will result in either having global
sensitivity that is large and does not diminish to 0 with the sample size (similar to the issues we
had with the nonparametric regression at the boundary estimator) or in the bins that are too wide.
In either case this leads to a significant amount of information about the distribution of the forcing
variable.
3.6 Monte Carlo illustrations
In this section, we want to illustrate our findings of the generally poor performance of the smooth
differentially private RDD estimators. We consider the sharp design and illustrate paths of the
differentially private local linear estimator with a triangular kernel for increasing sample sizes with
different degrees of the privacy protection. These paths are constructed for increasing samples from
the size of 300 till the size of 4000. For visual simplicity, we give paths for 20 independent realizations
of datasets.
Scenario 1.
The forcing variable X has a uniform distribution on [−1, 1]. The regression function is a fifth-order
polynomial, with separate coefficients for Xi < 0 and Xi > 0:
m(x) =
{
0.35 + 1.27x+ 7.18x2 + 20.21x3 + 21.54x4 + 7.33x5, if x < 0,
0.65 + 0.84x− 3x2 + 7.99x3 − 9.01x4 + 3.56x5, if x ≥ 0,
and the error u having a symmetric uniform distribution on [−0.12952 · √3, 0.12952 · √3]. The
bandwidth in the local linear estimation is chosen using the approach in [21].
Differentially private estimators are obtained by using the Laplace mechanism, which, as discussed
above, draws a mechanism nose from the Laplace distribution with mean zero and variance depending
on the global sensitivity of the local linear estimator a noise to the estimator.
In Panel 1 in Figure 1 we show the paths of the estimator in the absence of the mechanism noise when
the mechanism noise variance equal to 0.002 for any sample size (for a conservative lower bound of
4 · 0.12952 · √3 on the global sensitivity of the estimator9, this would correspond to N being 10
times of this δN = 0). Panel 2 in Figure 1 depicts the paths of the estimator when the mechanism
noise variance equal to 0.002 for any sample size (for a conservative lower bound of 4 · 0.12952 · √3
on the global sensitivity of the estimator, this would correspond to N being equal to 10 times of
this and δN = 0). Panel 3 in Figure 1 shows the paths of the estimator when the mechanism noise
variance equal to 2 for any sample size (for a conservative lower bound of 4 · 0.12952 · √3 on the
global sensitivity of the estimator, this would correspond to N being equal to this and δN = 0).
Finally, Panel 4 in Figure 1 illustrates the paths of the estimator when the mechanism noise variance
equal to 200 for any sample size (for a conservative lower bound of 4 · 0.12952 · √3 on the global
9See our discussion in the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix.
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Setting Var(mech noise =0) Var(mech noise =0.002) Var(mech noise =2) Var(mech noise =200)
5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1%
N = 500 1 1 0.6846 0.3706 0.0666 0.0286 0.056 0.023
N = 2000 1 1 0.7252 0.3880 0.0664 0.0290 0.0666 0.0272
N = 5000 1 1 0.7260 0.3844 0.0694 0.0284 0.0594 0.0250
Table 1: Rejection rates in 5000 simulations of the false null hypothesis H0 : τ = 0 in Scenario 1. N denotes
the number of observations.
sensitivity of the estimator, this would correspond to N being equal to the one-tenth of this and
δN = 0). Note the different range of the values on the vertical axis in these panels.
In Table 1 we focus on the rejection of the null H0 : τ = 0 against H1 : τ 6= 0 when a researcher
uses differentially private estimates and their standard errors (note that this is different from our
discussion of the differentially private release of t-tests in Section 3.4).
Scenario 2. The only difference here from Scenario 1 is that u is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance 0.12952. The support of the outcome variable is unbounded and the global sensitivity
is clearly infinite (see the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix) which means that regardless of
N , N ≤ ¯, in the Laplace differentially private mechanism the noise has to be drawn from the
distribution with an infinite variance. Figure 2 shows that paths of differentially private local linear
estimators for when the variance is equal to 106.
Here we could have conducted similar power analysis based on a large number of simulations, like
in Scenario 1, and we would have obtained that power of the test H0 : τ = 0 vs H1 : τ 6= 0 based on
differentially private estimates is very low.
4 Average Treatment Effect
A central problem in evaluation studies is that potential outcomes that program participants would
have received in the absence of the program is not observed. Letting Di denote a binary variable
taking the value 1 if treatment was given to agent i, and 0 otherwise, and letting Y0i,Y1i denote
potential outcome variables, we refer to Y1i − Y0i as the treatment effect for the i’th individual. A
parameter of interest for identification and estimation is the average treatment effect, defined as:
θ = E[Y1i − Y0i] (4.1)
As in the previous section our notation will be to denote realizations of random variables by lower
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case letters and the random variables themselves by capital letters. One identification strategy for
θ was proposed in [44], under the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 2 (ATE under Conditional Independence). Let the following hold:
(i) There exists an observed variable Xi s.t.
Di ⊥ (Y0i, Y1i)|Xi
(ii) 0 < P (Di = 1|Xi) < 1 ∀Xi
See also [18], [20], [4]. The above assumption can be used to identify α as
θ = E[E[Y |D = 1, X]− E[Y |D = 0, X]]. (4.2)
The above parameter can be written as:
θ0 = E
[
Y (D − p(X))
p(X)(1− p(X))
]
, (4.3)
where p(X) = P (D = 1|X) is the propensity score. This parameter is a weighted moment condition
where the denominator gets small if the propensity score approaches 0 or 1. Also, identification is
lost when we remove any region in the support of X (so, fixed trimming will not identify θ above).
Consider the general setting of the treatment effect model under unconfoundeness with two potential
continuous outcomes Y1 and Y0 and treatment D along with the vector of (continuous and discrete)
covariates X. We assume that (Y1, Y0) ⊥ D |X. The observed outcome is
Y = Y1D + Y0(1−D).
In our setup the propensity score needs to be estimated as a function of X. In the further discussion
without loss of generality we assume that X is single-dimensional. Our theory will be based on the
following structure:
ASSUMPTION 3. (i) X has a support X is a closed and continuous (but possible unbounded)
set.
(ii) (Y1, Y0) |X = x has an absolutely continuous density for each x ∈ X . Moreover the support
of Yk for k = 0, 1 is bounded.
(iii) The propensity score is strictly positive P (·) > 0 on its support.
We consider the following procedure to implement an estimator for θ0. First, a non-parametric
estimator is used to estimate the propensity score
P̂ (x) =
1
N
∑N
i=1DiK
(
x−Xi
hN
)
1
N
∑N
i=1K
(
x−Xi
hN
) , (4.4)
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where K(·) is a symmetric kernel and hN is the bandwidth. Then the average treatment effect θ0 is
estimated as:
θ̂ = ψ(PN ) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
YiDi
P̂ (Xi)
− Yi (1−Di)
1− P̂ (Xi)
)
. (4.5)
In our analysis we focus on the kernel-based estimator for the propensity score without the loss of
generality. One can use a different approach such as the series estimator where the number of terms
used to approximate the function would play the role of the tuning parameter equivalent to the
bandwidth parameter.
We consider the kernel functions K(·) with sub-polynomial tail behavior. In particular, we assume
that there exists natural number d > 3 such that for all k ≤ d, lim
|z|→∞
|z|kK(|z|) = 0. This ensures
existence of moments of kernel-weighted statistics over the distribution of X which is particularly
helpful when the support of X is unbounded. We note that all “standard” kernel functions such as
the bounded support uniform, quadratic and Epanechnikov kernel as well as the most commonly
used Gaussian kernel satisfy this condition.
The bandwidth is required to satisfy hN  log NN (see [42]) to ensure uniform convergence of the
propensity score estimator and is typically chosen so that hN = o(N
−1/4) to avoid the propagation
of the non-parametric bias to the estimator of the average treatment effect.
We now consider the impact of diffrential privacy on estimation of θ0. As in Section 3 we rely on our
smoothness assuption that allows us to focus on additive mechanisms to induce differential privacy.
Also, like in our previous analysis of the regression discontinuity design we start with the analyis of
the global sensitivity of ψ(PN ).
Proposition 7. Suppose that average treatment effect estimator (4.5) uses propensity score estima-
tor (4.4) and kernel function K(·) is such that |K(·)| ≤ K¯ and there exists natural number d > 3
such that for all k ≤ d, lim
|z|→∞
|z|kK(|z|) = 0. then
(i) If the support X is bounded and hN = o(N−1/4) the global sensitivity of functional ψ(PN ) in
(4.5)) is bounded away from zero as N →∞.
(ii) If the support X is unbounded then the global sensitivity of functional ψ(PN ) in (4.5)) is +∞.
This result allows us to formulate the following theorem.
THEOREM 7. For estimation of average treatment effect any smooth (εN , δN )-differentially pri-
vate propensity score-weighted estimator is inconsistent for any bounded sequence {εN} and non-
negative {δN}. As a result, the limiting random set TE contains at least one non-degenerate element
different from {θ0}.
41
5 Conclusion
Differential privacy is a powerful data security concept that precludes a potential adversary from
linking sensitive data with outside information, inferring data attributes or determining if particular
individual is included in the dataset. The implementation of the differentially private data analysis is
based on consideration of randomized estimator where independent randomness is the key instrument
that provides the differential privacy guarantee.
In this paper we focused on identification of Econometric models under differential privacy. We
concluded that even with relatively simple models identification in this context requires the concepts
and methods from the random set theory. We consider identification from the perspective of the
limit of statistical experiments where differentially private implementation of the estimator is applied
to the datasets of an increasing size. Identification in this case is the property of the set of weak
limits of such estimators. Under our mild regularity conditions this limiting set is a convex compact
random set and, thus, it needs to be characterized in probabilistic terms, for instance, using the
containment functional.
We apply our theory to two popular Econometric models: the regression discontinuity design (RDD)
and the average treatment effect (ATE). In the RDD settings we consider both sharp and fuzzy de-
sign. We show that for both models the random set of weak limits of differentially private estimators
contains non-degenerate random elements which precludes point identification of the parameters of
interest. We illustrate this finding in a series of Monte Carlo simulations.
Our result, in part, is driven by the structure of the estimators which have to rely on local properties
of the underlying distribution. This may indicate that under differential privacy a similar behavior
is to be expected for other Econometric models that rely on nuisance parameters.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of theorems and propositions in section 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Let ων be the element of the σ-algebra Fν associated with random element
νN and ωS be the element of the σ-algebra of the subsets of Zn. Since TN is the closure of the set of
measurable selections that form a closed and bounded space, then for almost all elements (ωN , ωS)
the set of values θ(PN (·;ωS), νN (ων)) is closed and bounded and, therefore, compact. Thus, random
set TN is compact.
To prove convexity, it is enough to consider θ(PN , νN ) and θ′(PN , νN ) that are realizations of two
regular (N , δN )-differential private and (
′
N , δ
′
N )-differential private estimators, respectively, where
sequences of (N , δN ) and (
′
N , δ
′
N ) are in E . Then by union bound their convex combination satisfies
(2.2) with the right-hand side bound of at most 2R¯(n, κ). Also, any convex combination τθ(SN , νN )+
(1−τ)θ′(SN , νN ) is a realization of the estimator τθ(·, ·)+(1−τ)θ′(·, ·). This estimator is differentially
private for the sequence of (max{N , ′N},max{δN , δ′N}) which belongs to E by our assumption of
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E being a join-semilattice. Finally not that the estimator τθ(·, ·) + (1 − τ)θ′(·, ·) has a weak limit
from the continuous mapping theorem as it is straightforward to show that (θ, θ′)T (·, ·) has a joint
weak limit (of course, we would use the fact that θ, θ′ do not depend on N). Thus, set TN is convex
random set. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Assume, contrary to the statement of the Lemma that ∆N = θ(SN , νN )−τ p−→
0. Then θ(SN , νN ) = τ + ∆N , and because τ is not constant, then conditional on SN and SN+1,
estimator θ(SN , νN ) and θ(SN+1, νN+1) cannot be independent. This, in its turn, will contradict the
independence of elements νN and νN+1, which is a fundamental requirement for differential privacy.

Proof of Theorem 1. Provided that θ(·, ·) belong to a compact subset of a separable space in
L1, for each χ there exists K such that for a finite set of elements {θ(1)(·, ·), . . . , θ(K)(·, ·)}, their
convex hull ΘKN is within χ-Hausdorf distance from set TN,E . Since each θ(k)(·, ·) is a function of
the same elements (ωN , ωS), weak convergence of θ
(k)(PN , νN ) implies joint weak convergence of the
set {θ(1)(·, ·), . . . , θ(K)(·, ·)} and, therefore, weak convergence of their convex hull. We then choose
sequence χN , which induces sequence KN such that sup
A
∣∣∣CΘKKN (A)− CTN,E (A)∣∣∣ is a decreasing
function of N. Then by Theorem 6.26 in [39] sequence of random sets TN,E converges weakly. 
Proof of Theorem 3. a) Suppose that for any sequence of (N , δN ) from E it holds that
any regular (N , δN )-differentially private estimator θ(PN , νN ) is such that θ(PN , νN )
p→ θ0. Then
TE = {θ0} (degenerate distribution at θ0). Then, clearly, for any convex polytope K 3 θ0 we have
CTE (K) = 1 ≥ 1− α for any α ∈ (0, 1).
b) Suppose for any α ∈ (0, 1) and any convex polytope K 3 θ0
CTE (K) ≥ 1− α.
Since α can be taken to be arbitrarily close to 0, this means that CTE (K) = 1. Since convex polytope
K 3 θ0 can be taken to have arbitrarily small volume, this means that TE = {θ0} (degenerate
distribution at θ0). Indeed, take a decreasing sequence Km 3 θ0 of convex polytopes such that
∩∞m=1Km = {θ0}. By the continuity theorem for monotone sequences of events CTE (∩∞m=1Km) =
limm→∞ CTE (Km) = 1, which immediately implies that TE = {θ0} meaning that every θ(SN , ηN )
converges weakly to θ0, and thus, θ(SN , ηN )
p→ θ0. 
6.1.1 On the selection expectation of the set of regular differentially private estimators
for θ0 in Section 2.3
Here we briefly discuss the properties of the selection expectation of the limiting random set TE of
regular differentially private estimators for θ0 in the context of the example in Section 2.3.
Let ΘN,E denote the selection expectation of the random set TN,E of all regular (N , δN )-differentially
private estimators for θ0 with sequences (N , δN ) from E . The Hausdorff limit of ΘN,E as N → ∞
is denoted as Θ∞,E .
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Θ∞,E , loosely speaking, contains all limits of expectations of regular differentially private estimators.
Ideally, if differentially private estimators are compatible with consistency, for a broad range of
sequences N and δN converging to zero the set Θ∞,E should be a singleton {θ0}.
Theorem 1.45 in [39] links Θ∞,E to the selection expectation of the limit random set TE . Indeed,
that theorem immediately implies that under conditions of Theorem 1, ETN,E converges to ETE in
the Hausdorff metric and the Lebesgue measure of ETN,E converges to the Lebesgue measure of ETE
as N →∞. In other words, weak convergence of a sequence of random sets implies the convergence
of the selection expectation.
Going back to the discussion of our example in Section 2.3, we note that even though in that example
differential privacy-inducing mechanisms perturb the estimator with random noise symmetric at zero,
there is no guarantee that the limiting Θ∞,E is a singleton at θ0. In If we collect differentially private
estimators across all three regimes in that example, we find that the corresponding limiting set of
selection expectations will include
EU ({Argminθ∈Θ θ,Argmaxθ∈Θ θ}) , {EΛ(c), c ∈ [0,+∞)}, 0, E[X].
We note that in this case the target expectation E[X] belongs to Θ∞,E . At the same time, the set
Θ∞,E itself is clearly large.
We also note that if we exclude the elements of the selection expectation that result from Regime
3 where the scale of double exponential noise asymptotically increases, the selection expectation of
our considered family of estimator will be a linear segment in Θ that connects points 0 and E[X]
since the set {EΛ(c), c ∈ [0,+∞)} is a line in Θ that connects 0 and E[X].
6.2 Proofs of theorems and propositions in section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. Treat G(N) as ∆N in AC2 and choose respective σ
2
N and [aN , bN ] as
in condition AC2. Take the definition of the differentially private estimator and note that for two
estimators ψ(SN ) and ψ(S
′
N ) based on two datasets that differ in one observation only, we have
PνN∼fN;σ2
N
(νN + ψ(SN ) ∈ B) = PνN∼fN;σ2
N
(νN + ψ(SN ) ∈ B|νN ∈ [aN , bN ]) +
+ PνN∼fN;σ2
N
(νN + ψ(SN ) ∈ B|νN /∈ [aN , bN ]) ≤ PνN∼fN;σ2
N
(νN + ψ(SN ) ∈ B|νN ∈ [aN , bN ])
+ PνN∼fN;σ2
N
(νN + ψ(SN ) ∈ B|νN /∈ [aN , bN ])
≤ eD(G(N),σ2N ,aN ,bN )PνN∼fN;σ2
N
(νN + ψ(S
′
N ) ∈ B|νN ∈ [aN , bN ])
+ PνN∼fN;σ2
N
(νN + ψ(SN ) ∈ B|νN /∈ [aN , bN ]) ,
where B is any subset of R. Thus, if N is greater os equal eD(G(N),σ
2
N ,aN ,bN ) (which also gives
acceptable rates of convergence for N to 0) and PνN∼fN;σ2
N
(νN + ψ(SN ) ∈ B|νN /∈ [aN , bN ]) δN
(which also gives acceptable rates of convergence for δN to 0), then (N , δN )-differential privacy
criterion is satisfied.
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At the same time, because both the mean and the variance of ξN converge to 0, then ξN converges
in probability to 0 and, therefore, in light of (3.5) the estimator θ̂ in (3.4) is consistent. 
Proof of Theorem 4.
As we will show, the inconsistency of the estimator θ̂ in (3.4) stems from the fact that the variance
of the mechanism noise ξN does not go to 0 with the sample size, which in its turn is explained by
the fact that the global sensitivity of ψ(SN ) does not go to 0 with the sample size.
Indeed, suppose that G(N) is bounded away from zero as N →∞ and is also bounded from above.
Then for a fixed large enough interval [aN , bN ], the value of D(G(N), σ2N , aN , bN ) has to be bounded
from above by εN . Since G(N) is bounded away from 0, from AC1 we have that
D(G(N), σ2N , a, b)→ +∞
if σ2N → 0 for a fixed interval [a, b]. The definition of D() as a supremum implies that the same
property will hold if instead of the fixed interval [a, b] we take [aN , bN ] converging to R. This
implies, of course, that σ2N has to be bounded away from zero. This, in turn, implies that ξN does
not converge in probability to zero even if the mean of ξN converges to 0. Hence, θ̂ dose not converge
in probability to the true parameter value.
If G(N) = +∞, then to guarantee (εN , δN )-differential privacy, one would have to take σ2N = +∞,
clearly leading to the inconsistency of θ̂.
Note that this inconsistency result applies even to (N , δN ) not changing with N . It will also be
true under stronger requirements of differential privacy when both parameters converge to 0. 
Lemmas 4 and 5 will help to establish results in Propositions 2-5.
LEMMA 4. Consider two weighted averages
q1 =
T∑
i=1
wiai + wT+1aT+1, where wi =
bi∑T+1
i=1 bi
, i = 1, . . . , T + 1,
q2 =
T∑
i=1
w˜iai + w˜T a˜T , where w˜i =
bi∑T
i=1 bi + b˜T+1
, i = 1, . . . , T, w˜T+1 =
b˜T+1∑T
i=1 bi + b˜T+1
,
and
0 ≤ c1 ≤ ( or <) bi, b˜i ≤ c2, (6.1)
d1 ≤ ai ≤ d2, i = 1, . . . , T + 1, and d1 < d2. (6.2)
Then
(a) if c1 = 0 and |d1|, |d2| <∞, then
max
a1,...,aT ,aT+1,a˜T+1,b1,...,bT ,bT+1,b˜T+1 s.t. (6.1),(6.2)
|q1 − q2| = d2 − d1.
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(b) if c1 > 0 and |d1|, |d2| <∞, then
max
a1,...,aT ,aT+1,a˜T+1,b1,...,bT ,bT+1,b˜T+1 s.t. (6.1),(6.2)
|q1 − q2| = c2(d2 − d1)
T · c1 + c2 .
(c) if d1 = −∞ or d2 = +∞, then
max
a1,...,aT ,aT+1,a˜T+1,b1,...,bT ,bT+1,b˜T+1 s.t. (6.1),(6.2)
|q1 − q2| = +∞.
In cases (a)-(c), max |q1 − q2| can be attained by a positive change as well as by a negative change
– that is, there are values of at’s, bt’s and a˜T+1, b˜T+1 such that q1 − q2 = max |q1 − q2|, and there
are values of at’s, bt’s and a˜T+1, b˜T+1 such as q1 − q2 = −max |q1 − q2|.
Proof of Lemma 4.
(a) In this case, we can take
• b1 = . . . = bT ≈ 0; bT+1 = b˜T+1 = c2;
• a1, . . . , aT can be arbitrary values that satisfy (6.2); aT+1 = d1, a˜T+1 = d2.
This gives us q2 − q1 = d2 − d1. Therefore, we should have max |q2 − q1| ≥ d2 − d1. At the same
time each weighted average q1 and q2 has to belong to [d1, d2], which is the range for ai’s. Therefore,
necessarily max |q2− q1| ≤ d2− d1. This implies that max |q2− q1| = d2− d1. Note that if above we
take aT+1 = d2, a˜T+1 = d1, then q2 − q1 = d1 − d2 = −|d2 − d1|.
(b) In this case, to evaluate the largest change in the weighted average we have to consider extreme
situations. The first extreme situation is when q1 = d1 and the (T +1)-th component in this average
has the largest weight and changes to the the other extreme d2 in the new average q2.
This situation can be described as
• b1 = . . . = bT = c1; bT+1 = b˜T+1 = c2;
• a1, . . . , aT = d1; aT+1 = d1, a˜T+1 = d2.
This will give us q2 − q1 = c2(d2−d1)T ·c1+c2 > 0.
In the second extreme scenario where bt’s and b˜T+1 are the same as above but q1 = d2 and the
(T + 1)-th component in this average has the largest weight and changes to the the other extreme
d1 in the new average q2, we obtain that q2 − q1 = − c2(d2−d1)T ·c1+c2 < 0. These two extreme scenarios
give us exactly the same |q2 − q1|.
Thus, max |q2 − q1| = c2(d2−d1)T ·c1+c2 .
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(c) In this case, consider the case when bi, i = 1, . . . , T+1, and b˜T+1 are any values that satisfy (6.1).
Suppose d2 = +∞. Let ai, i = 1, . . . , T + 1, take any finite values while a˜T+1 is very (arbitrarily)
large. This gives q1−q2 = −∞ and, thus, |q1−q2| = +∞. Therefore, in this case max |q1−q2| = +∞.
If, of course, a˜T+1 is taking a finite value while aT is very (arbitrarily) large, then q1 − q2 = +∞.
The case of when d2 is finite but d1 = −∞ is analyzed analogously.

LEMMA 5. Consider two weighted averages
q1 =
T∑
i=1
wiai + wT+1aT+1, where wi =
bi∑T+1
j=1 bj
, i = 1, . . . , T + 1,
q2 =
T∑
i=1
w˜iai, where w˜i =
bi∑T
j=1 bj
, i = 1, . . . , T,
where bi and ai satisfy conditions (6.1) and (6.2), respectively. Then
(a) if c1 = 0 and |d1|, |d2| <∞, then
max
a1,...,aT ,aT+1,a˜T+1,b1,...,bT ,bT+1 s.t. (6.1),(6.2)
|q1 − q2| = d2 − d1.
(b) if c1 > 0 and |d1|, |d2| <∞, then
max
a1,...,aT ,aT+1,a˜T+1,b1,...,bT ,bT+1 s.t. (6.1),(6.2)
|q1 − q2| = c2(d2 − d1)
T · c1 + c2 .
(c) if d1 = −∞ or d2 = +∞, then
max
a1,...,aT ,aT+1,a˜T+1,b1,...,bT ,bT+1 s.t. (6.1),(6.2)
|q1 − q2| = +∞.
In cases (a)-(c), max |q1 − q2| can be attained by a positive change as well as by a negative change
– that is, there are values of at’s, bt’s such that q1− q2 = max |q1 − q2|, and there are values of at’s,
bt’s such that q1 − q2 = −max |q1 − q2|.
Proof of Lemma 5.
(a) In this case, we can take
• b1 = . . . = bT ≈ 0 (arbitrarily close values to 0); bT+1 = c2;
• a1 = . . . = aT = d1; aT+1 = d2.
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This will give q1 ≈ d1, q2 ≈ d2 and, thus, q2 − q1 ≈ d2 − d1 > 0.
Therefore, we should have max |q2 − q1| ≥ d2 − d1. At the same time each weighted average q1 and
q2 has to belong to [d1, d2], which is the range for ai’s. Therefore, necessarily max |q2−q1| ≤ d2−d1.
This implies that max |q2 − q1| = d2 − d1.
(b) In this case, to evaluate the largest change in the weighted average we have to consider extreme
situations. An extreme situation is when in q1 the (T + 1)-th component (which is later dropped in
when defining q2) has the largest weight and the value that is maximally different from the values
of the first T components.
The first extreme situation can be described as
• b1 = . . . = bT = c1; bT+1 = c2;
• a1, . . . , aT = d1; aT+1 = d2.
This gives us |q2 − q1| = c2(d2−d1)T ·c1+c2 .
The second extreme situation, where bt’s are the same as above but a1, . . . , aT = d2 and aT+1 = d1,
gives us the exactly same value of |q2 − q1|. Thus, max |q2 − q1| = c2(d2−d1)T ·c1+c2 .
(c) In this case, consider the case when bi, i = 1, . . . , T + 1, and b˜T+1 are any values that satisfy
(6.1). Also, let ai, i = 1, . . . , T + 1, take any finite values while a˜T+1 is very large (arbitrarily large)
in the absolute value. This gives |q1 − q2| = +∞. therefore, in this case max |q1 − q2| = +∞. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
(a) The global sensitivity of the estimator is calculated by comparing the results of the estimation
for two datasets that differ only in on data point. In order to calculate the global sensitivity, we
need to keep in mind the following things:
(i) the new data point can enter a K-h-neighborhood of c (thus, the old data point was outside
of both K-h-neighborhoods of c)
(ii) the new data point can fall outside of both K-h-neighborhoods of c (thus, the old data point
was inside one of K-h-neighborhoods of c)
(iii) the new data point remains in the same neighborhood
(iv) the new data point can switch neighborhoods
In order to find global sensitivity, it is enough for us to find maximum absolute changes in the
estimate in these four situations and then takes their maximum. Let us consider these four different
situation listed above. In this proof we use Lemmas 4 and 5 with c2 = K¯, where K¯ denotes the
maximum value the kernel K(·), and c1 = 0 since K(·) is continuous and, therefore, K = 0.
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(i) Suppose the new data point enters the K-h-neighborhood to the left of c while the old data point
was outside of both K-h-neighborhoods of c. Then by part (a) of Lemma 5, the maximum absolute
change G0L in the estimate in this case is G0L = Y
l − Y l. Analogously we can consider the case
when a new data point enters the K-h-neighborhood to the right of c. Then the maximum absolute
change G0R in the estimate in this case is G0R = Y
r − Y r.
(ii) In this case we have two situations – in one situation the old data point was in the left K-
h-neighborhood and in the other situation the old data point was in the right K-h-neighborhood.
In both situations the new data point falls outside of both neighborhoods. In the former case the
maximum absolute change in the estimate coincides with G0L, and in the latter case the maximum
absolute change in the estimate coincides with G0R.
(iii) When the observation remains in the left K-h-neighborhood, we apply part (a) of Lemma 4 to
obtain that the maximum absolute change GLL in the estimate in this case is GLL = Y
l − Y l.
When the observation remains in the right K-h-neighborhood, we consider the maximum absolute
change GRR in estimate and analogously to above show that GRR = Y
r − Y r.
(iv) Suppose an observation moves from the leftK-h-neighborhood to the the rightK-h-neighborhood.
Our estimator of interest is the difference between the weighted means in the right and the left K-h
neighborhoods of c. Therefore, the move of the observation from one neighborhood to the other
affects both parts of the estimator.
As we know from part (a) of Lemma 4, the maximum absolute change in the weighted average for
the right-hand side is G0R = Y
r − Y r and that this degree of change can be attained as a positive
change (increase). Similarly, the maximum absolute change in the weighted average for the left-hand
side is GLO = Y
l−Y l and that this degree of change can be attained as a negative change (decrease).
In order to obtain the maximum absolute changes for the difference in weighted means we have to
look at the cases when these two weighted means change in opposite directions, which leads to the
maximum change being GLR = Y
r − Y r + Y l − Y l.
Analogously, we can consider an observation moves from the right K-h-neighborhood to the the left
K-h-neighborhood and show that in this case the maximum absolute change is GRL = Y
r − Y r +
Y
l − Y l.
To sum up the results of part (a), the global sensitivity is
G(N) = max{GL0, GR0, G0L, G0R, GLR, GRL, GLL, GRR} = Y r − Y r + Y l − Y l.
(b) Suppose for instance that the support Yr is unbounded. Then part (c) of Lemmas 4 and 5 will
immediately give us that for GR0, G0R, GRL, GRR defined above,
GR0 = G0R = GRL = GRR = +∞,
which implies this part of the proposition. Other cases in this part of the proposition lead the same
conclusion.
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
Proof of Proposition 3.
Just like in Proposition 2, the global sensitivity is
G(N) = max{GL0, GR0, G0L, G0R, GLR, GRL, GLL, GRR},
where GL0, GR0, G0L, G0R, GLL, GRR, GLR, GRL are defined as in the proof of Proposition 2.
Once again, we will rely on the results in Lemmas 4 and 5 but this time in part (b) in both lemmas
as we will take c1 = K and c2 = K, where K is the maximum value of kernel K.
(a) Applying results of part (b) of Lemma 5 and noting that the minimum number of observations
in the left and the right K-h-neighborhoods of c is ml(N) and mr(N) respectively, we obtain that
GL0 = G0L =
K(Y
l − Y l)
ml(N) ·K +K ,
GR0 = G0R =
K(Y
r − Y r)
mr(N) ·K +K .
Applying results of part (b) of Lemma 4, we have
GLL =
K(Y
l − Y l)
(ml(N)− 1) ·K +K , GRR =
K(Y
r − Y r)
(mr(N)− 1) ·K +K .
We next consider GLR which quantifies the case when an observation from the left K-h neighborhood
of c moved in to the right-hand side neighborhood. Suppose we started with T + 1 observations
in the left K-h-neighborhood, where ml(N) ≤ T ≤ N −mr(N). We need to evaluate the biggest
change that happened in the left-hand side neighborhood, the biggest change in the right-hand
side neighborhood and evaluate their directions (whether these changes are acting in the same or
opposite directions). Relying on the results of part (b) of Lemma 5 we can establish that given T the
largest absolute change in the weighted mean in the left K-h neighborhood of c is K(Y
l−Y l)
T ·K+K , and the
largest absolute change in the weighted mean from acquiring an extra point in that neighborhood
is K(Y
r−Y r)
(N−T−1)·K+K .
As shown in Lemma 5, these changes can be either positive or negative. Since our estimator of
interest is the difference between the weighted means in the right and the left K-h neighborhoods
of c, to get maximum absolute changes for a given T we have to look at the cases when these two
weighted means change in opposite directions. For a given T this gives us the maximum absolute
change
K · (Y l − Y l)
T ·K +K +
K · (Y r − Y r)
(N − T − 1) ·K +K .
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Now we just need to find the maximum of this over T such that ml(N) ≤ T ≤ N − mr(N). If
Y
r − Y r > Y l − Y l, then the maximum is attained at T = N −mr(N), otherwise it is attained at
T = ml(N). To summarize,
GLR = max
{
K · (Y l − Y l)
ml(N) ·K +K +
K · (Y r − Y r)
(N −ml(N) − 1) ·K +K ,
K · (Y l − Y l)
(N −mr(N)) ·K +K +
K · (Y r − Y r)
(mr(N) − 1) ·K +K
}
.
The case of GRL which quantifies the case when an observation from the right K-h neighborhood
of c moved in to the left-hand side neighborhood is considered analogously. In this case,
GRL = max
{
K · (Y l − Y l)
(N −mr(N) − 1) ·K +K +
K · (Y r − Y r)
mr(N) ·K +K ,
K · (Y l − Y l)
(ml(N) − 1) ·K +K +
K · (Y r − Y r)
(N −ml(N)) ·K +K
}
.
This gives the result that G(N) is of the rate 1
min{ml(N),mr(N)} .
(b) Suppose e.g. that the support Yr is unbounded. Then part (c) of Lemmas 4 and 5 give us that
G0R = GR0 = GRR = +∞,
which implies that G(N) = +∞.

Proof of Proposition 4. The proof in this case is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2. Since
the kernel has an unbounded support, there are no longer case of observations falling outside of
either neighborhood or entering a neighborhood. Therefore, the global sensitivity is
G(N) = max{GLR, GRL, GLL, GRR},
where GLL, GRR, GLR, GRL are defined as in the proof of Proposition 2. Throughout the proof we
apply Lemmas 4 and 5 with the strict inequality version (0 = c1 < bi) in (6.1).
(a) When the observation remains to the left of c, we apply part (a) of Lemma 4 to obtain that the
maximum absolute change GLL in the estimate in this case is GLL = Y
l
all − Y lall.
When the observation remains to the right of c, we consider the maximum absolute change GRR in
estimate and analogously to above show that GRR = Y
r
all − Y rall.
Suppose an observation moves from the left of c to the right of c, or from the right of c to the left
of c. Analogously to the proof of of Proposition 2, we can establish that
GLR = GRL = Y
r
all − Y rall + Y
l
all − Y lall.
(b) Analogous to the proof in Proposition 2.

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Proof of Proposition 5.
Just like in Propositions 2 and 3, we want to find
G(N) = max{GL0, GR0, G0L, G0R, GLR, GRL, GLL, GRR}
where GL0 and GR0 are sensitivities in situations of a new observation leaving the left or the right
h-neighborhood, respectively; and G0L and G0R are sensitivities in situations of a new observation
entering the left or the right h-neighborhood, respectively; GLR and GRL are sensitivities in cases
of an observation switching the neighborhoods; GLL and GRR are sensitivities in cases when an
observation changes within the same neighborhood.
Since the local linear estimator effectively considers observations whose running variable values are in
a small neighborhood around c, we employ (3.11) as approximations of the support for the outcome
in one-sided neighborhoods of c.
As we know,
α̂R = yR − (xR − c)
∑N
i=1(qixi − xR)qiyi · 1(c ≤ xi)∑N
i=1(xiqi − xR)2 · 1(c ≤ xi)
α̂L = yL − (xL − c)
∑N
i=1(xiqi − xL)yiqi · 1(xi < c)∑N
i=1(xiqi − xR)2 · 1(xi < c)
,
where qi = K
(
xi−c
hN
)
, yR =
∑N
i=1 qiyi1(c≤xi)∑N
i=1 qi1(c≤xi)
, xR =
∑N
i=1 qixi1(c≤xi)∑N
i=1 qi1(c≤xi)
, yL =
∑N
i=1 qiyi1(xi<c)∑N
i=1 qi1(xi<c)
, xL =∑N
i=1 qixi1(xi<c)∑N
i=1 qi1(xi<c)
.
If at least one of Y
l
, Y l, Y
r
or Y r is unbounded, then it is obvious that the global sensitivity
is infinite as in this case we can consider a change in the value of the outcome variable for one
observation and we can imagine that it changes from some finite number to the one arbitrary large
one in the absolute value.
However, we want to show that G(N) = ∞ even if the support of the outcome is bounded. Let
us show that GRR = ∞. Consider a situation when the first T ≤ N observations in our data are
in the right-hand side neighborhood. Consider, for example, realizations of the datasets when only
T -th observation in the right-hand side neighborhood changes its value xT . Suppose we have the
following realized data in the right-hand side neighborhood:
xi = c+ ∆N , i = 1, . . . ,m
r(N)− 1 (6.3)
xT = c+ u0hN −∆N , x′T = c+ ∆N −∆Nδ, (6.4)
for some 0 < ∆N << u0hN and 0 < δ < 1. For a kernel K(·) with a bounded support u0 > 0 is the
value such that (−u0, u0) is the support of this kernel. If K(·) has an unbounded support, then we
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can take u0 to be a very large positive number. Whatever the situation is, we can take
qi ≈ K(0), i = 1, . . . ,mr(N)− 1
qT ≈ K, q′T = K(0),
where K = infu∈(−u0,u0)K(u). Suppose that yT = y
′
T . Then
α̂R ≈ yR −
(
(c+ ∆N )(T − 1)K(0)
(T − 1)K(0) +K − c
)
×
×
K(0)((c+ ∆N )K(0)− (c+∆N )(T−1)K(0)(T−1)K(0)+K )
∑T−1
i=1 yi +KyT
(
(c+ u0hN −∆N )K − (c+∆N )(T−1)K(0)(T−1)K(0)+K
)
((c+ ∆N )K(0)− (c+∆N )(T−1)K(0)(T−1)K(0)+K )2 +
(
(c+ u0hN −∆N )K − (c+∆N )(T−1)K(0)(T−1)K(0)+K
)2
α̂R ≈ yR −∆N
(
1− δ
T
)
× −
∆Nδ
T
∑T−1
i=1 yi − yT T−1T ∆Nδ
(T−1)∆2Nδ2
T 2 + (
T−1
T ∆Nδ)
2
For fixed T , hN , ∆N , it is possible to have δ ↓ 0, in which case we have that
|α̂′R − α̂R| → ∞.
Since there are no changes in α̂L, we conclude that GRR =∞, and thus, G =∞.
Note that when the kernel either has an unbounded support or has a bounded support with K = 0,
then even without using δ ↓ 0, we can establish that the global sensitivity is bounded away from zero
for any N , using techniques similar to those in Propositions 2 and 4. The proof above is based on the
ability to have realizations of the data such that the minimum eigenvalue of the matrix 1T X˜
T
r X˜r can
be arbitrarily close to zero, where X˜r is the T × 2 matrix of regressors (1, xi− c) for when xi ≥ c. If
in the implementation of a differentially private a data curator wants to establish a strictly positive
lower bound on the minimum eigenvalue of this matrix, then in the case of a kernel with a bounded
support and K > 0 (like the uniform kernel), the global sensitivity in this case can be shown to
have the rate 1
min{mr(N),ml(N)} . However, an issue with this is given in discussion after Proposition
3 and is related to the fact that there is a always a strictly positive probability of the number of
observations being strictly less mr(N) in the K-h-neighborhood to the right or strictly less than
ml(N) in the K-h-neighborhood to the left.
It is obvious that when the support of Y |X in the neighborhood to the right of c or to the left of c
is unbounded, then G(N) = +∞, which can be shown by just changing one value of Yi only.

Proof of Proposition 6.
Just like in Proposition 5, we can formulate the problem as that of finding
G(N) = max{GL0, GR0, G0L, G0R, GLR, GRL, GLL, GRR},
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where GL0 and GR0 are sensitivities in situations of a new observation leaving the left or the right
h-neighborhood, respectively; and G0L and G0R are sensitivities in situations of a new observation
entering the left or the right h-neighborhood, respectively; GLR and GRL are sensitivities in cases
of an observation switching the neighborhoods; GLL and GRR are sensitivities in cases when an
observation changes within the same neighborhood. When we say ”leaves a neighborhood” or ”enters
a neighborhood”, we mean that with respect the value of Xi.
If we follow the textbook definition of differential privacy and, thus, consider all possible realizations
with data no matter how small the probability of these realizations is as long as it is strictly positive,
then we can show that G(N) = +∞. Indeed, let us show e.g. that following the textbook definition
of differential privacy, we have that GRR =∞.
Consider a situation when the first T ≤ N observations in our data are in the right-hand side
neighborhood in the values of Xi. Consider, for example, realizations of the datasets when only
T -th observation in the right-hand side neighborhood changes its value xT while its values WT and
YT do not change. Then, of course,
α̂y,L = α̂
′
y,L, α̂w,L = α̂
′
w,L.
Now we will use the same realizations for X1, . . . , XT , X
′
T as given in (6.3)-(6.4) in the proof of
Proposition 5. Also, we will take the realization of the dataset when Wi = 1, i = 1, . . . , T or Wi = 0,
i = 1, . . . , T (again, due to the fuzzy scenario, the probability of this scenario may be perceived
as low but it is strictly positive and, thus, has to be taken into account by a differentially private
mechanism). Then we can take, of course, that
α̂w,R = α̂
′
w,R
as the values of indicators 1(Xi ≥ c), i = 1, . . . , T , do not add any explanatory power in the local
linear regression of Wi on constant and 1(Xi ≥ c) in the right-hand side neighborhood (one can
think of this situation as the situation of the perfect fit in the reduced form in the IV regression
even though technically α̂w,R and β̂w,R may not be separately estimated in a sample like the one we
suggested). Thus, changes in the value of τ̂F,LocLin in (3.3) happen only because of the changes in
the numerator. The changes in the numerator are, of course, the same as the changes in α̂R described
in the proof of Proposition 5 and, thus, manipulating δ, we can make this change arbitrarily large
in the absolute value, leading us to conclusion that GRR = +∞.
Even if one wanted to deviate from the textbook definition of differential privacy and restrict Wi,
i = 1, . . . , T , to have some variation in each neighborhood – e.g. by requiring a minimum number of
zero’s and one’s in each neighborhood or a fixed proportion – in this case, it would be straightforward
to show that the global sensitivity would be bounded away from zero as N →∞.
Indeed, in this case even using the same example with T realizations of X1, . . . , XT , X
′
T in the
right-hand side neighborhood with the values given in (6.3)-(6.4) in the proof of Proposition 5, we
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would obtain that manipulating δ approaching 0, change in both the numerator α̂y,R − α̂y,L and
the denominator α̂w,R− α̂w,L are arbitrarily large in the absolute value but they become arbitrarily
large with the same rate in δ, thus allowing us to conclude that the change is constant and show
that this constant change may not diminish to 0 with the sample size.
It is obvious that when the support of Y |X in the neighborhood to the right of c or to the left of c
is unbounded, then G(N) = +∞, which can be shown by just changing one value of Yi only.
Note that for simplicity we used the uniform kernel to define (3.3). In the case if one were using a
kernel with a bounded support but K > 0 or a kernel with an unbounded support, the proof of the
global sensitivity bounded away from zero would even be more straightforward.

Proof of Proposition 7 Since the support of Y is bounded by Assumption 3, the global sensitvity
is determined by variation of the empirical weight 1/P̂ (x) over X . Then
sup
x,x′∈X
∣∣∣1/P̂ (x)− 1/P̂ (x′)∣∣∣ ≥ K¯/(hNK(diam(X )/hN )).
Note whenever diam(X ) is infinite, an infinte lower bound applies and (ii) immediately follows.
When diam(X ) is finite, global sensitivity of ψ(PN ) is bounded from below by K¯/(N hNK(diam(X )/hN )).
For hN = o(N
−1/4), since lim
|z|→∞
|z|kK(|z|) = 0 for k ≤ d with d > 3, then N hNK(diam(X )/hN ) =
o(1) and, thus global sensitivity of ψ(PN ) does not decrease as N →∞.

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Figure 2: Illustration to Scenario 2. Twenty independent paths of differentially private estimators
local linear estimators for increasing sample sizes when the Laplace mechanism noise has the variance
equal to 106.
